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Executive summary
In this report, we investigate three key features of regulatory agencies: their indepen-
dence, their accountability, and their perceived quality. We investigate these three fac-
tors for sixteen regulators drawn from four sectors (telecoms, energy, competition, and
rail) operating in five different countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom).
Our report is based, first, on a comprehensive analysis of the legal situation regarding
independence and accountability in each of these countries and sectors, and, second,
sophisticated modelling of independence and accountability which relates multiple as-
pects of these features to a single underlying trait. Our report is the first empirical study
to test the links between independence, accountability and quality across multiple sec-
tors.
Our findings address each of these features, but also address the links between these
features and the policy recommendations that flow from these findings.
Concerning independence, we find that the core of legal independence is found in
thirteen different criteria, including statements of independence from market players
(1) and political actors (2), clear incompatibility rules concerning positions in regulated
industries (3) and in politics (4), a clear separation from the sponsoring ministry (5),
exclusive and fairly detailed competences (6), a lack of any ministerial power to instruct
(7) or over-rule (8) the regulator, agency budgets that are separate from the general
state budget (9) and controlled by the agency itself (10), specified term lengths for heads
of agencies and/or board members (11) with constraints on re-appointment (12), and
limits on dismissal (13).
Concerning the measurement of independence, we find that many of these criteria
can be reduced to form a single overall measure. This overall measure shows a clear
progression from criteria which frequently fulfilled – such as clear statements of agency
independence and limits on ministerial powers to over-rule the agency – to criteria which
are fulfilled in far fewer cases, such as constraints on re-appointment and long term-
lengths for members of the regulator.
Concerning accountability, we find that the core of legal accountability is found in
twenty-four different criteria, which can be grouped according to the organisation(s) to
which the regulator is accountable. Thus, we discuss criteria concerning accountability
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towards political institutions (10 items), accountability towards the public and the market
(10 items), and accountability towards judicial institutions (1 item), European authorities
(2 items), and accountability towards peers (1 item).
Concerning the measurement of accountability, we find that some criteria relating to
accountability – such as whether or not the objectives of the regulator are well-defined
in legislation, and whether or not the regulator is accountable via horizontal networks
– are present in all of the regulators we look at. We cannot therefore include them in
a single overall measure of accountability. Concerning the remaining criteria relating
to accountability, we find a progression from requirements to follow certain basic pro-
cedural requirements, to requirements to make public certain types of information, to
requirements to periodically evaluate the regulator’s work.
Concerning quality, we argue that peer evaluations of regulatory quality are a suitable
proxy for the overall, or ‘true’ level of quality of a regulator. In particular, we argue that
pairwise comparisons of regulators give consistent and reliable estimates of the quality
of regulators in different sectors and in different countries. These estimates are con-
sistent across different types of ‘judges’, be they academics, regulators, or regulatees.
The only adjustments that must be made are adjustments to regulators who promote
their own organisation.
Concerning the links between independence, accountability, and quality, we find
that there is both (1) a statistically significant and positive link between independence
and perceived quality, and (2) a statistically significant and positive link between ac-
countability and perceived quality. What is more, independence and accountability are
themselves positively related. This suggests that robust independence and accountabil-
ity measures can effectively co-exist and contribute to better outcomes. Evaluating the
joint impact of independence and accountability is difficult because of the limited num-
ber of regulators in our sample, and because of the important confounding effect of the
level of resources available to the regulator. However, we present evidence suggesting
that none of these links is due to coincidence.
Accordingly, our study provides empirical support for the EU approach to the design
of regulatory agencies, which combines independence and accountability and seeks to
find the optimal balance between them.
Concerning the policy implications stemming from this work, we suggest that (1)
regulators push for greater independence and accountability in the light of the positive
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effects on perceived quality; (2) that regulators seek out ‘low-hanging fruit’: that is, that
they try to acquire criteria with low scores on our maps of independence and account-
ability, rather than immediately trying to acquire ‘high-scoring’ criteria; (3) that increases
in independence and accountability be pursued together as part of balanced packages;
(4) that high-scoring regulators (on our measures) focus on the breadth and quality of
their involvement in horizontal networks and judicial action; and (5) that regulateesmake
common cause with regulators to push for greater accountability.
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1.1. The current situation
European sectoral regulators can no longer be described as being in their infancy.
Though patterns differ across countries and across sectors, most independent regula-
tory agencies are now in their teenage years, if not already in young adulthood. There
are, of course, exceptions to this generalization – the German Bundeskartellamt will
celebrate its fifty-fifth anniversary next year, whilst some rail regulators have only been
created in the past two to three years. Yet this generalization is one of many concerning
European sectoral regulators. We know broadly how and why patterns in the establish-
ment of these regulatory agencies differ: regulatory agencies were set up earliest, and
granted most independence, in political systems with relatively few veto players in which
there was frequent alternation in government of opposing political parties or coalitions,
and in sectors most characterised by high technical complexity and network effects (Gi-
lardi, 2002, 2005; Elgie and McMenamin, 2005). This trend – which has now spread
across Europe and indeed worldwide – has sometimes encountered resistance. For in-
stance, national public law communities (academics, practitioners) have typically been
reluctant to accept that regulatory agencies be made independent from the legislative
and executive powers. Furthermore, there is continued skepticism about the degree to
which formal provisions regarding the independence of these regulatory agencies trans-
late into real independence in the day-to-day work of those agencies (Maggetti, 2007;
Yesilkagit and Van Thiel, 2008). Nevertheless, those regulators which were established
in Western Europe in the eighties and nineties have, by now, developed track records
that enable them to be evaluated on the quality of their work.
It is precisely this issue, of the quality of regulators’ work, that is addressed here. The
establishment of independent regulatory agencies was justified on the basis that reg-
ulation carried out by independent agencies would deliver better outcomes than regu-
lation by ministries. This claim was in turn based on the idea that political principals
have time-inconsistent preferences, which lead them to prioritise low consumer prices
over investment in infrastructure, and which generally ‘spook’ investors (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977; Majone, 1996), and on the idea that sectoral regulation often requires
a degree of technical complexity which cannot be met by an organisation headed by
a politician (Majone, 1994). As a consequence, politicians – be they in the legislature
or the executive power – are liable to stray from the public interest and take decisions
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which are misinformed or influenced by rent-seeking on the part of market players. Yet,
as we go on to argue, demonstrating this hypothesis – that more independent regulators
deliver better quality performance or outcomes – has been difficult.
Overall, in Europe policy makers have implicitly or explicitly accepted the reasons de-
veloped in political science to justify the creation of independent regulatory agencies –
the technical complexity of the regulated markets, the need to insulate regulation from
short term political priorities, the creation of a more predictable business environment
that is more conducive to investment, and, ultimately, the hope of superior market per-
formance. But the law has not yet developed aminimum legal threshold for independent
regulatory authorities that can effectively ensure that the stated goals of independence
are met effectively. Thus, a “legal” concept of independence with uniformly applicable
legal requirements to safeguard independence is lacking.
At least historically, the difficulty in developing a coherent legal concept of indepen-
dence might have been rooted in the constitutional law traditions of European member
states. Independence has always been regarded as the essential, core concept for the
judiciary, but not as a feature of the executive branch where ministerial control over all
administrative decisions and ministerial responsibility towards parliament are the foun-
dational principles. Adhering to this strict dichotomy would seem to leave little room for
independent decision making within the executive branch.
More specifically, in a classical separation of powers perspective, the independent reg-
ulatory agencies are caught between a rock and a hard place, conceptually.2 If they are
independent, they should belong to the judiciary power (or at least be like the judiciary),
in which case they should be tasked with the mere interpretation and application of the
law (according to the classical theory). Indeed, a number of authors are justifying the
existence of independent regulatory agencies under a classical perspective by arguing
that they are simply implementing policy decisions made by the executive (and for which
the executive is accountable to the Legislature). Yet such a line of argument cannot re-
sist a reality check. Regulatory matters cannot be split neatly between policymaking and
implementation; rather, they consist in complex decision-making chains, ranging from
the most general to the case-specific (Larouche and De Visser, 2006). Policy decisions
are being taken through most of the chain. According to the classical perspective, then,
regulatory agencies cannot both be independent from the Legislature and executive
2 The discussion in this paragraph is sometimes presented as a Continental (as opposed to common
law) perspective on independent regulatory agencies. However, in the US and the UK, the same de-
bates took place, albeit at an earlier stage, given the longer tradition of independent agencies in these
jurisdictions (since the 1930s for the US, since the 1980s for the UK).
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and engage into policy-making. In practice, independent agencies are now firmly es-
tablished in the European regulatory landscape, and they conduct policy-making. This
led one of us, in a recent piece, to propose an alternative theoretical perspective that
would fit the observed practice better (Hancher and Larouche, 2011, 743-4):
Recent developments point towards a generalization of the conflict-of-interest
rationale: in short, even if Member States have no direct interest in any of
the market players, regulatory matters are high-stake games where market
players will deploy considerable resources to try to influence the outcome
(rent-seeking behaviour). Regulatory decisions must therefore be made in
an environment which is shielded from undue influence as much as pos-
sible: this would imply transparency, independence of the decision-maker,
openness, a duty to state reasons and the possibility of review, i.e. the
characteristics of a regulatory agency. By implication, the role of the Leg-
islative and the Executive would be limited to issues where there is no clear
controversy among market players, i.e. issues where a decision does not
immediately make winners and losers. This would explain why, in a decision
chain model, the Legislative and the Executive can deal with the highest lev-
els – provide guidelines and set out policy objectives – but cannot go very far
down the decision chain, since very rapidly market players will begin to hold
diverging views on the outcome and will engage in rent-seeking behaviour.
[footnotes omitted]
Furthermore, even once it is accepted that regulatory agencies can be independent
from the executive and legislative powers, constitutional expectations of political re-
sponsibility and control over the executive branch remain. This is why, as we explore
in this report, a specific European model of regulatory agencies has emerged, which
combines independence with accountability. Striking the balance between the comple-
mentary, yet potentially conflicting goals of independence and accountability is not an
easy task. Solutions vary widely among member states, and sometimes among inde-
pendent regulators in the same member state.
EU law adds another layer of complexity in the European model of regulation, since
all independent regulators covered by this report oversee markets characterized by a
direct and strong influence by EU law. It is worth emphasizing that the phenomenon of
independent regulatory agencies has developed at a national level quite independently
of EU law requirements. Most Member States came to recognize that independent
agencies were an appropriate vehicle to address regulatory concerns in a number of
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areas. EU law merely provided an additional – and sometimes decisive – impetus in
favour of independent agencies. Such agencies also exist in areas which are not directly
influenced by European law.
The concept of independence has a long history in European law, both with respect to
regulated markets and in other contexts. In Directive 88/301 on competition in the mar-
kets in telecommunications terminal equipment [1988] OJ L 131/73, the Commission
introduced at Article 6 an obligation upon Member States to entrust the regulation of
terminal equipment to a body independent from market parties active in the provision
of telecommunications services or equipment (in a context where Member States typ-
ically still owned the monopoly provider of telecommunications services, this was also
branded as the separation of regulatory and operational functions). More than twenty
years ago, the Court of Justice upheld this provision, finding that independence from
market players was required by the principles of equality of opportunity between mar-
ket players, effective competition and transparency.3 Giving a market player control
over, or even greater influence upon, regulatory matters would put that player in a posi-
tion to distort competition. While the independence of regulatory agencies from market
players has not significantly been challenged since, independence from the legislative
and executive branches of government has had a more complicated story. Originally,
the latter form of independence was seen as a consequence of the former: because
Member States still held a significant part, if not outright control of, the largest opera-
tor, there was a risk of conflict of interest, within the government, between the interests
of the State as shareholder and as regulator. Accordingly, the two interests needed
to be entrusted to separate entities within the government (typically the ministries of
finance and of industry, respectively).4 This was still far from independence. Over the
years, the relevant EU legislation has become increasingly detailed as regards the re-
lationship between the regulatory authority and the executive and legislative powers. In
parallel, European courts have upheld the relevant provisions, but without going as far
as to derive from them a general principle of independence of regulatory authorities.5 In
3 ECJ, 19 March 1991, Case C-202/88, France v. Commission [1991] ECR I-1223 at para. 51-52. See
also ECJ, 13 December 1991, Case C-18/88, RTT v. GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5973 at para. 25-26.
4 See for instance Directive 90/387 on Open Network Provision [1990] OJ L 192/1, Article 5a as added
by Directive 97/51 [1997] OJ L 295/23. This provision is now found in Article 3(2) of Directive 2002/21
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications and services [2002] OJ L 108/33.
5 See ECJ, 6 March 2008, CMT v. Administracíon del Estado [2008] ECR I-1265, where the Court
leaves open the possibility that a ministry might be in charge of at least part of the numbering-related
functions reserved to regulatory authorities under Directive 2002/21, provided that the requirements of
the Directive are complied with. Taking this line to its logical end, the Court (6 October 2010, Base, nyr)
also accepted that a Legislature might act as the regulatory authority for some of the functions listed
in Directive 2002/22 on universal service [2002] OJ L 108/51, but it insisted that the Legislature must
meet all requirements regarding competence, independence, impartiality, transparency and judicial
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its furthest reaching judgment, the Court struck down German legislation which would
have pre-empted the decision of a regulatory agency, but stopping short of formulating
a general principle of independence.6 It is only with the latest set of Directives, in 2009,
that, beyond detailed provisions contributing to independence, a general principle of
independence towards the legislative and executive organs is mentioned for the first
time.7
To illustrate this point, in rail transport the focus of European law remains on the reg-
ulator’s legal and functional separation from market actors; although even in this re-
spect the exact independence criteria remain unsettled as illustrated by pending liti-
gation against several member states. And to the extent European law requires the
independence of regulators also from political institutions (such as in communications
and energy markets), it does so without systematically developing a set of ‘political in-
dependence criteria’ that regulatory authorities must meet. Rather, as indicated above,
EU law (until recently) tended to emphasize the elements of independence, in specific
provisions, rather than the principle as such.
Similarly, even though, as we explain in this report, the balance between independence
and accountability defines the European approach to regulatory agencies, EU law shies
from explicitly setting out a general principle of accountability (which might be reliably
derived from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States). Instead, EU
law, in the sectors under study, is rife with provisions that can be construed as ele-
ments of a general accountability principle, be they obligations of transparency, report-
ing, consultation, etc., or mechanisms of judicial review, peer control through regulatory
networks or control via the Commission. As with independence, the number of such el-
ements has grown over time. In parallel, the number of principals has proliferated that
can hold an independent regulator accountable, some have asked whether there may
be too much accountability in the European regulatory model which could interfere with
review. Considering that no legislative body is likely to meet these requirements, the Court is therefore
making it almost impossible for Member States to keep regulatory functions within the Legislature (or
by extension within the executive).
6 ECJ, 3 December 2009, Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-11431, para. 53-54.
Throughout this judgment, the ECJ is careful to keep its reasoning within the scope of the provisions
of Directive 2002/21 and to avoid making a general pronouncement on the independence of regulatory
authorities towards the executive and legislative powers.
7 The new electricity and gas directives are the most explicit. Directive 2009/72 concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity [2009] OJ L 211/55, compels Member States at Article 35 to make
the regulatory authority “functionally independent from any other public or private entity” and give it the
autonomy to decide “independently of any public body” (see Directive 2009/73 [2009] OJ L 211/94, Art.
39 for gas). In electronic communications, Directive 2009/140 [2009] OJ L 337/37 adds a provision to
the Framework Directive (Article 3(3a)), stating that regulatory authorities must “act independently…
from any other body”, yet only as concerns ex ante regulation and dispute settlement tasks.
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the regulator’s work. Our study, however, was not designed to resolve that question.
As a result of this situation, there is a rich pool of accountability mechanisms and there is
law on accountability, but an even greater lack of attempts to develop a set of uniformly
applicable, legal accountability criteria.
One goal of our study has therefore been to identify sets of ‘core’ legal criteria, for
both independence and accountability, that we could use to assess and compare the
regulatory authorities covered in this report.
1.2. Empirical literature on the consequences of independence
Much has been written on the consequences of independence. In particular, indepen-
dent regulators have been associated with higher interconnection rates (Edwards and
Waverman, 2006) and greater firm efficiency (Li and Waddams, 2011) in telecoms mar-
kets; greater financial leverage in a range of utilities sectors (Bortolotti et al., 2011),
higher capital ratios in banking (Gilardi and Servalli, 2011) and increased levels of in-
vestments in a variety of regulated sectors (Cambini and Rondi, 2011).
However, much of this literature suffers from one of three problems:
• Poor measurement of independence. Many scholarly articles on the indepen-
dence of regulators – particularly the independence of regulators in the telecoms
and electricity sectors – measure independence poorly. Specifically, many articles
use a simple dichotomy – either an independent regulatory agency has been set
up (and so is assumed, ipso facto, to be independent), or it has not. These articles
go on to demonstrate the outcomes associated with this dichotomous measure.
This dichotomous measure is unhelpful in the contemporary European experi-
ence, where the presence of independent regulatory agencies is almost uniform,
but where degrees of independence differ considerably.
• Poor choice of outcome. Whilst many of the outcomes cited in the above litera-
ture are important in themselves, they do not tap broader aspects of the work of
regulatory agencies. Financial leverage or interconnection rates are, after all, only
one outcome influenced by regulators, and it may be that whilst independent regu-
lators have recognisable effects on these outcomes, they may also have other un-
known and potentially ill-advised (or beneficial) effects on other outcomes. What
is needed is therefore a more global overview of the performance of regulatory
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agencies.
• Disentangling causal paths. Because many of these studies focus on partic-
ular outcomes such as interconnection rates, they must control for a number of
other factors which might also affect interconnection rates, including but not lim-
ited to, changes in the economy, existing market structure and changes in that
market structure, and other barriers to entry. These ‘other factors’ are numerous
and cannot be ignored – but the need to include factors such as this means that
estimates of the effects of independence on ‘quality’ outcomes are dependent on
the degree to which the authors have controlled for such factors. A more direct
assessment of the link between independence and quality is therefore desirable.
In this report, we hope to meet these problems directly by using a sophisticatedmeasure
of independence and tying it to more direct measures of regulators’ quality. Before doing
so, we spend some time detailing the specific regulators that we focus on.
1.3. Empirical literature on accountability
Much has been written on accountability, but few attempts have been made to develop
an empirical measurement for accountability of independent regulators and even fewer
to empirically establish the consequences of accountability on performance. Account-
ability is a loosely defined term which means different things to different authors, in-
cluding good governance, transparency, equity, integrity, openness and dialogue with
citizens, and democracy. In the European literature on accountability, for example,
many scholars have focused on the role of accountability in the governance structure of
the European Union and on the accountability deficit (for example, Curtin et al. 2010),
an approach to accountability that has limited relevance for the topic of our study. The
lack of a consistent conceptual framework and incoherence in the accountability dis-
cussion has been connected with lack of empirical progress in the field of accountability
standards (Bovens, 2010).
The narrower topic of accountability of regulatory authorities has of course also been ad-
dressed in the literature, which has identified various instrumental and structural mech-
anisms for enhancing accountability ex ante or ex post (Maggetti, 2010). In addition
to the more traditional top-down mechanisms (focusing on accountability to the demo-
cratic legitimate principal) and bottom-up mechanisms (focusing on accountability to
stakeholders), the literature has also highlighted the importance of ‘horizontal account-
ability’ towards peers, mostly within European networks (Hood, 1995). We were able
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to use these efforts to map various accountability mechanisms in order to develop our
own set of accountability criteria. There have been very few attempts in the literature to
quantify accountability in a cross-sectoral and cross-country study (but see Koop 2011),
and we believe that our study is one of the first attempts to examine an empirical link
between accountability and quality in such a setting.
1.4. Case selection
In this report, we consider sixteen regulators altogether. These regulators are listed by
country and sector in Table 1.1; the acronyms we use to refer to them are intuitive for
the most part but are also listed in full on page 12.
We note that some of these regulators cover multiple sectors. The NMa, for example,
has competence in the energy and rail sectors. In this report we do not explicitly consider
the dual character of such regulators. We give each regulator a single score on inde-
pendence, accountability, and perceived quality. We do not, therefore, assess whether
these regulators perform better work when they act as, say, energy regulators rather
than general competition authorities. This may be an avenue for future research.
1.4.1. Why these sectors?
These sectors were chosen for four separate reasons:
• first, because they represent a mix of sectors in which independent regulatory
authorities are well-established (competition authorities) and sectors in which in-
dependent regulatory authories have been relatively recently established, if at all
(rail);
• second, because whilst work has been done on the effects of independence in
energy and telecoms, the same cannot be said of the effects of independence in
competition (since effects are too broad) and in rail (because too new);
• third, because the sectors broadly matched the interests of CERRE members,
who come from a range of sectors; and
• fourth, because including competition authorities (which are not strictly ‘sectoral’)
makes it easier to put the perceptions of quality that we discuss in section 4 on
a common scale. This is so because these authorities are found in all of the
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countries we examine, have a long history upon which they can be evaluated,
and are comparatively well-known.
1.4.2. Why these countries?
The choice of countries is less well-motivated than the choice of sectors. This is be-
cause the choice of countries largely reflected the interests of CERRE members. Nev-
ertheless, the five countries in question display a variety of legal systems and variety
in the timing of their establishment of independent regulatory agencies, from very early
adopters (the United Kingdom) to relatively late adopters (Belgium).
1.5. Plan of the report
Our report proceeds through each of the features we identify as key – independence,
accountability, and quality. In chapter 2, we discuss the key features of independence,
and in particular the way in which we can model independence as consisting of a series
of items located at different ‘thresholds’ separating lower- from higher-independence
regulators. In chapter 3 we proceed in a similar fashion, discussing the elements of
accountability, and how this too can be modelled. In chapter 4 we discuss measures
of quality in regulation, and how a suitable proxy for quality can be found in the peer
evaluations of regulators compared two-at-a-time. Finally, in chapter 5 we use the mea-
sures of independence and accountability discussed in chapters 2 and 3, together with
























































































































































In this section we discuss the concept and the measurement of independence. We
begin by noting some conceptual problems common in discussions of independence.
We thenmove on tomeasurement of independence in terms of a select number of items,
or provisions, which reflect higher or lower levels of independence. Wemap these items
and discuss their contribution to independence. We then move on to showing how the
regulators in our study score on this measure of independence.
2.1. Conceptual clarification
Our hypothesis is that levels of independence affect regulators’ perceived quality. In
other words, more independent regulators do better work. However, there are a number
of difficulties involved in measuring independence which must be discussed before we
can talk about regulators having more or less independence.
The first issue we must deal with lies in specifying what kind of independence, and
independence from whom. It is common to distinguish between de jure and de facto
independence, or the independence that an organisation has according to the law, and
the independence that an organisation has according to practice. Here, we concentrate
on de jure independence. We do so for three reason. First, dealing with de facto inde-
pendence involves very difficult judgement calls; there is the risk that any measure of de
facto independence might either be too subjective, or too broad, to be satisfactory. Sec-
ond, dealing with de jure independence has clear policy recommendations – for whilst
it is possible to recommend that the law be changed, and relatively easy to change
statutes, it is much harder to recommend that practices be changed, and harder still
to change those practices. Third, although we concentrate on de jure independence,
we know that political science studies assessing both de jure and de facto indepen-
dence have found that these two aspects are correlated (Hanretty and Koop, 2010). In
fact, as the legal requirements concerning independence are specified in greater detail
(going into resources, appointments, etc.), the room for de facto independence to di-
verge considerably from de jure independence is reduced (save for the unlikely case of
a wholesale failure to respect legislation). Thus, any improvements to de jure indepen-
dence may ultimately result in improvements to de facto independence.
As indicated in Section 1, it is also important to distinguish between independence from
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the executive and legislative powers (i.e. independence from politics) and indepen-
dence from regulated interests. The latter is less controversial (in both theory and prac-
tice) and as such it will not be considered further in this report. The majority of our items
used in measuring independence concern independence from politics. We concen-
trate on independence from politics because, as set out above, much of the literature
on the creation of independent regulatory agencies has argued that these agencies
have been created because elected politicians take poor (temporally-inconsistent, non-
Pareto-optimizing) decisions, and that agencies can take better decisions if they are
independent of these politicians. Although we do not discuss independence from regu-
lated interests, later we discuss extensively accountability towards regulated interests
through the publication of relevant information and other rules on disclosure.
The law on independence also reflects these two dimensions, i.e., independence from
market participants and independence from political institutions, although the latter is
the more recent feature. Historically, as mentioned in Section 1, the focus has been
on independence from market players (i.e. the separation of regulatory and operational
functions), which figured in early European legislation and which the Court rapidly estab-
lished as a core element in regulated markets. The Commission and the Court derived
the requirement to separate regulators and regulated market players from competition
law principles, thus implicitly assuming that market performance would improve with
greater independence of regulators.
Until recently, only independence from market participants was specifically required in
European legislation.8 At the same time, the EU seemed to take a piecemeal approach
to independence from politics: whilst it was not mentioned, a number of elements sup-
portive of independence from politics were required by EU law, so that Member States
were gently nudged towards accepting. Indeed, it could be observed that, at Member
States, there was a greater, yet uneven, willingness to make regulatory agencies in-
dependent from politics as well. A prime example can be found in national competition
authorities, to whichMember States have granted independence from politics as if it was
a matter of course, despite the absence of any requirement to that effect in Regulation
1/2003 or its predecessor.
As noted in Section 1, independence from the executive and legislative powers has only
recently been mentioned in directives concerning energy and communications markets.
Here as well, beyond a brief general clause, EU law continues along its piecemeal ap-
8 Today independence from market participants remains the sole legal requirement in EU legislation con-
cerning rail transport, although here, again, most member states are willing to go beyond the European
requirements.
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proach, with the addition of new specific elements conducive to independence, appar-
ently in response to events in certain Member States that could be seen as an attack on
the independence of regulators. The reactive nature of the legislation may also explain
the appearance of ad-hoc measures that regulate certain independence criteria in great
detail, but lack provisions related to other criteria. For example, the 2009 revisions to
the electronic communications framework directive add detailed provisions concerning
the dismissal of heads of agencies, but lack anything on their appointment as well the
length of the term and its renewability.
The concept of independence from political institutions may be quite recent for regulated
sectors, but it has a long tradition in other areas of European law. The understanding
of what was legally required to ensure independence can to some extent enrich the
discussion of what constitutes the ‘core’ legal concept of independence for market reg-
ulators.
By way of illustration, independence has been a key element in distinguishing ‘courts
or tribunals’ that may refer questions on European law to the Court of Justice under
Article 267 TFEU from regular administrative agencies that do not have the right to re-
fer. Even if the analogy has its limits, elements in the case law on what constitutes an
‘independent’ tribunal are relevant also to establish independence of regulatory author-
ities, such as the Court’s requirements of specific and limited reasons for termination
and dismissal, and of a prohibition against ministerial instructions or supervision. Vague
dismissal provisions, on the other hand, have been identified as a risk to complete in-
dependence.
In a case examining limitations to the independence of the European Central Bank, the
Court identified several provisions at the core of independence, such as the prohibition
against any influence by other Community institutions or member state governments,
the prohibition on the ECB from seeking instructions; the ECB’s legal personality, own
resources and budget authority; and specific dismissal provisions. At the same time,
however, the Court confirmed that certain types of control of independent authorities
remain permissible if they do not undermine independent decision making in the ar-
eas which have been allocated to the authority’s exclusive jurisdiction. A more recent
case on the independence of data protection agencies has also clarified which hierar-
chical relations between political institutions and independent regulators impermissibly
interfere with independence.
While the law on independence to date remains a patchwork, a Commission staff pa-
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Table 2.1.: Independence: our working definition
Independence A regulator is de facto independent to the degree that the
regulator takes day-to-day decisions without receiving and
acting on the basis of instructions, threats, or other induce-
ment from politicians or market players, or the anticipation
thereof; or considering whether the interests of those politi-
cians or particular market players would be harmed by par-
ticular choices about those decisions. A regulator is de
jure independent to the degree that the legislation or statute
governing the regulator works so as to make instructions,
threats, or other inducements impossible.
Note: adapted from the definition found in Hanretty (2010)
per on the independence of energy regulators (European Commission, 2010) may lay
out how a more comprehensive, systematic legal approach to independence might look
like in the future. Among other elements, it refer to separate budget allocation and in-
dependent spending authority; separate premises; sole responsibility for management,
organization, and staffing matters; sanctions (including possibly criminal sanctions) in
case of violations of independence provisions; and sufficient resources and salaries that
attract qualified staff. At this point, the paper remains more like a vision, as it is unclear
whether the Court will accept the paper’s expansive interpretation of existing legislation,
but it may identify where existing independence requirements might be tightened in the
future.
The second issue we must deal with lies in specifying what items to include in any index
of independence, and how to weigh those items. Independence, as found in legislation,
takes many different forms. One statute might wish to guarantee the independence of
an agency by making it very difficult for politicians to dismiss the head of the agency.
Another statute might wish to guarantee the independence of an agency by giving it
a funding stream which cannot easily be altered by politicians – such as contributions
from regulated operators. It is not clear, in the abstract, whether the former should have
a greater weight, or count for more, than the later. Nor is it clear whether all possible
items are equally good candidates for inclusion in any eventual index.
A third issue concerns the different possibilities within each item. Some common items
– such as funding, or obligations towards the executive – have multiple possibilities.
An agency may face no reporting obligations to the executive (or the legislature), or
may simply have to send an annual written report, or may face an annual in-person
briefing at the sponsoring department. The order of these items, in terms of their con-
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sequences for independence, is not, we would suggest, in doubt. Agencies which must
brief their sponsoring department in person presumably face less independence than
agencies which face no reporting requirement. But how big is the gap between these
different options? If in-person reporting diminishes independence by x units compared
to annual written reporting, does annual written reporting diminish independence by the
same amount compared to no reporting, more, or less? These questions of spacing
are difficult to tackle.
In developing our list of independence criteria, we built upon a list of criteria commonly
used in the political science literature, which we then cross-checked against those cri-
teria that most commonly appear in European legislation, case law, and legal literature
on independence. Thus, we eschewed a ‘state of the art’ approach where we would
have included every measure of independence that we could find in legal sources, and
instead created a list of what we saw as ‘core’ independence criteria in light of their
frequent use in a variety of legal sources.
Our approach is at once simple and sophisticated. It is simple in that we allow the
data to answer many of the issues we posed in terms of inclusion, exclusion, weighting,
and spacing. Institutional features that are commonly found together are taken to be
independence-promoting; institutional features that are commonly absent together are
taken to be independence-weakening. If we have enough data available, we can cal-
culate numbers which reflect the weighting of each item. Items that cluster with other
independence-promoting items receive a high weight. Items which sometimes cluster
with other independence-promoting items, but which sometimes are found alongside
independence-weakening features, are given a lower weight, because they are noisier
signals of the level of an agency’s de jure independence.
The technique that we use – an ordinal factor analytic model – is described in a technical
appendix. Fortunately, (almost) all of the parameters estimated by the model can be
presented in an easy to interpret visual format. We list all of the items that we include
in Table A.3.
2.2. Mapping the stages of independence
Figure 2.1 plots the parameters estimated by the model. Items are ranged down the left
hand column, and are listed in a particular order. That is, they are listed in order of the
lowest threshold associated with each item.
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Note: Plotted positions refer to the threshold where two adjacent options are equally likely.
Thus, plot points marked ‘1’ refer to values of independence for which either the zero-th or the
first listed option is equally likely. See the body of the text for a listing of the different options.
The number plotted in the right-hand side of the map is the discrimination parameter. See text
for a description of the discrimination parameter.
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Table 2.2.: List of items measuring independence
Item Description
Political indep. Whether or not the regulator is described in legislation as
being independent
Instructions Whether or not the minister may instruct the regulator in (a)
no issues, (b) general issues or (c) specific issues
Term Whether the head of the agency is appointed for (a) 4 (b) 5
(c) 6 years
Finances Whether or not agency finances are separate from state fi-
nances
Overturn Whether or not politicians can overturn agency decisions
Exclusive Whether or not the agency has exclusive regulatory compe-
tence in its sector
Budget Whether or not the agency controls its own budget
Renewal Whether the appointment of the agency head may be re-
newed (a) multiple times, (b) once only or (c) not at all
Political incom-
pat.
Whether or not agency members may hold political office
Removal Whether or not the agency head may be removed from of-
fice (other than through non-policy related issues such as
sickness or incapacity)
The threshold for each item – or more specifically, for each item response – is the point
at which a regulator is equally likely to have one of two adjacent item responses. Take,
for example, the first threshold listed, for political independence. Here, there are two
item responses:
0 No, the regulator is not described as politically independent
1 Yes, the regulator is described as politically independent
The threshold plotted is the threshold between the zero-th and the first listed option.
Thus, a regulator with an independence score of approximately -5.1 would be equally
likely to be not described as politically independent as it is to be described as politically
independent. (Note that we cannot move the other way: just because a regulator is not
described as politically independent does not mean that it has an independence score
of close to -5.1. Other features of the regulator’s governance might affect its score. Only
if the regulator had low-independence responses for all other items could we conclude
that that the regulators’ independence was either roughly equal to or below). To the right
of this threshold, regulators are more likely to be described as politically independent;
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to the left of the threshold, they are less likely to be described as such.
This is the first listed threshold, or, what is equivalent the threshold with the lowest
value. If we were speaking from the perspective of those drafting government legislation
delegating power to independent regulators, we might also describe this item not just
as the item with the lowest threshold, but the ‘easiest’ item – in this case, the easiest
concession to the independence of the regulator. Alternately, if we were speaking from
the perspective of a would-be independent regulator, we would describe this item as
the ‘easiest’ to achieve.
The next ‘easiest’ item to achieve for a regulator that wishes to be independent concerns
the instructions that may be given to the regulator. Here, however, the relevant item has
two thresholds rather than one. That is because there are three possible responses to
this item:
0 The minister may instruct the regulator on all matters
1 Theminister may instruct the regulator, but only concerning broad frameworks outside
of any individual case
2 The minister may not instruct the regulator
The easiest threshold bridges the zeroth and first responses. That is, after obtaining
a statement of its independence from politics, the next ‘easiest’ guarantee of indepen-
dence for a regulator to achieve is a practical and easily-stated constraint on the min-
ister’s action: namely, a bar on his/her ability to issue instructions on specific cases.
Thus, a regulator with an independence score of approximately -4.13 would be equally
likely to be able to be instructed on all issues as it would be to be instructed on frame-
work issues only. Regulators with higher independence scores, however, would be less
likely to be able to be instructed on all issues, and more likely only to be instructed on
framework – up to a certain point, at which the regulator is decreasingly likely to be able
to instructed on framework issues, and increasingly likely to be free from any kind of
instruction.
The next item concerns the term of members of the regulator. In discussing this item,
we must also discuss the discrimination parameter. The discrimination parameter is
listed in the right hand side of the plot. It can be interpreted as the degree to which
the given item successfully discriminates between regulators of similar independence.
The higher the discrimination parameter, the more quickly the probabilities of answer-
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ing in adjacent categories increase or decrease: in other words, the item becomes a
more reliable and clear cut guide to the true level of independence of the regulator.
Here, however, the discrimination parameter is negative, suggesting that the criteria is
related to independence, but in the opposite direction to that predicted. Negative dis-
crimination parameters imply that higher-ordered categories are associated with less
independence rather than more (for items with multiple possible responses), or that
having a certain property is associated with less independence (for items which regula-
tors either possess or lack).
In this specific case, the negative discrimination parameter of -0.94 implies that longer
term lengths of six years or more actually imply less independence than terms of four
or five years. This finding does not tally with previous research on the measurement of
independence (Hanretty and Koop, 2011). It is likely to be a consequence of the fact that
the regulators in our sample have heads who are generally appointed for longer five- or
six-year terms, rather than shorter three- or four-year terms found in other regions of the
world. In this specific situation, it may mean that regulators who wish to achieve greater
de jure independence would be better pushing for greater restrictions on politicians’
ability to instruct them – or clearer separation of their finances, which is dealt with by
the next item.
The item on finances is, once again, an item with only two responses. The lower inde-
pendence response involves the finances of the regulator being dealt with as part of the
general finances of the state. The higher independence response involves the finances
of the regulator being dealt with by the regulator itself.
This item is similarly located to the item on the power of politicians to overturn agency
decisions. Both items require a score of between -3 and -2 to answer in the ‘higher-
independence’ category. In both instances the item is relatively discriminating when it
comes to identifying higher- and lower-independence regulators.
The same cannot be said of the next item, which concerns exclusive competencies.
Here, the negative discrimination parameter signals that having exclusive competence
over a particular area is actually associated with lower levels of independence. It seems
that having exclusive control over a particular area does not mean that such control
will be exercised independently. This, then, is good news for sectoral regulators who
operate alongside other sectoral or cross-cutting regulators. This finding also tallies
with previous research on independence (Hanretty and Koop, 2011).
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We skip over the item relating to control of the agency’s budget (an important, and
highly-located item) to briefly discuss the last three items. Whether appointments to the
regulator may be renewed or not is a very highly discriminating item which is located
towards the top end of the independence spectrum. The logic here is that by prevent-
ing reappointment, or by preventing reappointment more than once, regulators cannot
be ‘put on trial’ by politicians, and only re-appointed conditional on how they have dis-
charged their duties in previous years. This turns out to be slightly more discriminating
than a clear statement of political incompatibility. In turn, both of these items turn out
to be much more discriminating than the issue of removal, which strangely turns out to
discriminate relatively little between regulators of otherwise similar levels of indepen-
dence.
2.3. Mapping the regulators
The same model that we used to find out the relative ordering of items relating to inde-
pendence can also be used to produce estimates of the independence of each regula-
tor. These estimates are plotted in Figure 2.2. The estimates are presented with their
associated 95% confidence intervals.
There is much less variation concerning the independence of regulators than there is
concerning the contribution of individual items relating to independence. This is perhaps
understandable. Regulators in the same country may work from essentially the same
governance template, adapted only to their special needs. Consequently, we might not
expect them to differ very much in their degree of independence. This means that al-
though we can be confident that the ‘true’ independence of OPTA is greater than the true
independence of the SRTF, to take the two regulators at opposite ends of the scale, we
can be much less confident when comparing regulators in the middle of the figure. That
is, we cannot be very confident that the true independence of the Bundesnetzagentur is
greater than the true independence of the NMa – though this is still more likely than not.
As is common with models of this kind, estimates of extreme positions are less precise
than estimates of positions towards the middle of the scale.
Note that all the estimates of independence are in the range [-2,2]. This is very different
from the estimates of the thresholds, which were in the range [-6,2]. This shows that
we cannot easily read across from a particular feature of a regulator’s governance to its
independence score. In reality all regulators have governance structures that are a mix
of ‘high-independence’ features and ‘low-independence’ features.
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Note: Dots indicate the best model-based estimate of the regulator’s independence. Lines
surrounding the dots show the 95% confidence interval of this estimate.
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The independence scores for certain regulators are lower than we had expected based
on our reading of the legislation. This is particularly the case for the two German regula-
tors. Readers should note that the independence score of the regulators depends on an
interpretation of the governance provisions in the applicable national laws. Which inter-
pretation is preferred will affect the ranking in particular for regulators in the middle of the
figure. This can be best illustrated with the example of the Bundeskartellamt. The low
independence score of the Bundeskartellamt is explained primarily by the appointment
and dismissal provisions concerning the head of the authority: the President’s term is
not defined (therefore there is no need to state anything about renewability) and there
are no provisions limiting the Minister’s discretion to remove the President from office.
These features are, in fact, extremely rare among the regulators we have examined in
this report. In addition, the minister has the power to issue general guidelines.
Yet the Bundeskartellamt has a unique governance structure: the President is head of
authority, but has no influence in the decision making process. All decisions are adopted
by decision making departments whose members belong to the Bundeskartellamt staff
and enjoy all job protection guarantees of German civil servants. They are not subject
to any instructions by the President when adopting decisions and, thus, act like quasi
judicial, independent panels.
In our evaluation of the Bundekartellamt’s independence, we decided to focus on provi-
sions governing the position of the head of authority, to ensure consistency and facilitate
comparability across all regulators. This is also consistent with the approach taken else-
where in the literature using a comparative approach to examine the independence of
regulators (de Visser, 2009). We accept, however, that there would be a greater de-
gree of independence if we had focused on the level below the President. Future work
on independence might address this problem with a more refined model to measure
independence.
Taking the independence scores as given in the table, and noting the particular problems
relating to the interpretation of the legislation governing the two German regulators, we
note that the disparities in independence between sectors are less marked than the
disparities between country. More specifically, whilst there is a statistically significant
difference between the perceived quality of regulators according to country (F-value of
3.94 on 4 degrees of freedom, p = 0.03), the same cannot be said of quality by sector
(F-value of 0.84 on 3 degrees of freedom, p = 0.5). Belgium (mean score of -0.68) and
Germany (mean score of -0.02) are the countries with the least independent regulators;
Netherlands (mean score of 0.44) and France (mean score of 0.47) are the countries
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with the most independent regulators.
2.4. Conclusion
In this section we have outlined our approach to measuring independence, and have
stated that we measure the de jure independence of regulators from politics, rather than
actual independence, or independence considered more broadly. We have described
how, rather than assigning arbitrary weights and thresholds to certain items, we have
‘let the data do the work’, and estimated the contribution to independence of a variety
of items. We have then discussed, by way of a discussion of each item, how regu-
lators might move from low-independence to high-independence, and have presented
estimates of the level of independence of each regulator.
This measurement is essential if we are to gauge the contribution of independence
to regulators’ perceived quality. Only by measuring independence accurately can we
test the link between these two variables. Only by measuring independence in this
way can we chart the next policy-relevant steps for regulators to improve their level of
independence, and thus achieve greater levels of de facto independence – and, as we
show in section 4, greater quality.
We note the technical details of the model we used in an appendix present at the end
of the report. For the moment, we turn to assessing the levels of accountability of the




Just as with the independence of regulators, the accountability of regulators needs to
be clarified conceptually. Like independence, accountability as a concept benefits from
a considerable ‘halo effect’, in that it is presumed to be positive, and measures taken to
improve or extend accountability are seen positively in virtue of the positive association
which attaches to the root concept. This halo, however, may obscure as well as illumi-
nate. In the first part of this section, we discuss the concept of accountability, and relate
it to the items included in a particular index of accountability. We go on to discuss how
we can map the stages of accountability, and place regulators on that same metric.
3.1. Conceptual clarification
We would make three conceptual points about accountability (all of which are borrowed
from Philp 2009). The first point is that accountability is a relationship between two
actors. That is, accountability exists when some A is accountable to some B.
In our case, it is clear that it is the regulator which is accountable to other actors. It is
not so clear to whom the regulator is accountable. Are regulators accountable to politi-
cians (and if so, which sets of politicians: those in the national government, those in
the national legislature, or politicians at other levels, such as the European level)? Or
are regulators instead accountable to a broader set of actors, including but not limited
to national publics and regulated actors? Here, we distinguish a number of different
accountability relationships: accountability to politicians, accountability to the market,
accountability to the judiciary,9 and accountability towards relevant peer groups such
as networks of sectoral regulators, or the European Commission. Some of these ac-
countability relationships, such as accountability to the judiciary and accountability to
peer groups, are tapped only by a few criteria. Some other relationships, such as ac-
countability towards politicians and the market, are broader, and this breadth is reflected
in a larger number of criteria relating to this relationship.
Our second point is that accountability is a relationship which involves ‘giving account’:
that is, informing, explaining, and justifying conduct. Because of this, many of the items
9 One could argue that, since the judiciary does not generally have the right to act on its own motion,
accountability to the judiciary is in fact a proxy for accountability to regulated firms and – to the extent
that they have standing, see ECJ, 21 February 2008, Case C-426/05, Tele2 Telecommunication [2008]
ECR I-685 – members of the general public.
120306_CERRE_Study_Independence 37
in our index of accountability relate to the provision of information: the submission of an-
nual plans and reports, both to political institutions and to the wider public; the schedul-
ing of face-to-face meetings with relevant parliamentary committees or advisory bodies
drawn from the public or relevant market players; and publication of reasons and data
underlying decisions taken by regulators.
Our third point is that accountability need not, as a matter of definition, involve sanc-
tioning behaviour. Philp (2009, 35) explains the distinction as follows:
The intuition behind the desire to make sanctioning analytically part of the
definition of accountability is that, without any sanctions, accountability could
be an entirely paper exercise. The intuition behind resisting this move is
that A is accountable if he or she can be required to give an account, irre-
spective of whether certain consequences may follow from doing so. The
former intuition is strongly encouraged by principal-agent thinking – since
Y wants to be able to get A to do certain things and needs to use incen-
tives and disincentives to ensure that he or she does – and by those who
are concerned that without sanctions the process may be toothless. But the
latter intuition (resisting sanctions) is related to the recognition that much
accountability concerns imparting information, transparency, reporting and
justification, and that these processes do not have to be driven by the threat
of sanctions to have value.
This conceptual point is ultimately born out by our empirical analysis. Although we
begin by including an index item which relates to sanctioning – specifically the power
of the minister to dismiss the head of the agency – we find that this item is unrelated
to the other items which measure accountability towards political institutions and other
stakeholders. We consequently remove it from our index (see below).
This conceptual point also matters when we consider the relationship between account-
ability and independence. Accountability and independence are sometimes taken to be
inimical to each other. This is based on the view that accountability requires the possibil-
ity of sanctioning, and mechanisms which allow sanctioning compromise independence
towards political institutions and other stakeholders. If, however, accountability can be
achieved by transparency and publication requirements alone, then the two concepts
will be easier to reconcile in practice.
As regards accountability toward the European Commission and the judiciary, sanc-
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tioning mechanisms exist (and, at least in the case of courts, must exist). This could be
seen as a challenge to the position we adopt in this report that sanctioning behavior is
not a necessary component of effective accountability mechanisms. We believe that we
have a good answer to this challenge as far as the European Commission is concerned;
as far as courts are concerned, we find it more difficult to develop a good answer that
satisfies all three authors to the same extent, although we note that this question does
not affect the results of this report.
As to accountability towards the EuropeanCommission, we accept that elaborate schemes
have been developed in the areas of competition, communications, and energy that
allow the Commission to influence (if not outright veto) decisions by national regula-
tors. These could be seen as a sanctioning mechanism that is an instrumental part in
the Commission’s toolbox to hold national regulators accountable. We consider more
significant, however, that while the threat of ‘sanctions’ always exists in these areas,
the Commission has used its power rarely (and not at all in some areas). Communi-
cation and cooperation mechanisms shape accountability toward the Commission to
a much greater extent than the ‘hard instrument’ of interfering with national authority
decisions. Thus, transparency and publication/communication mechanisms appear to
explain quite well how accountability toward the Commission works in practice.
The very role of courts in a regulatory system is to sanction. They are there to review the
work of regulators, and to quash their decisions if they have made substantive or proce-
dural mistakes. That makes it more challenging to maintain the view that accountability
systems can work without sanctioning mechanism. Of course, the role of courts might
develop along the same lines just described for the Commission: there are some ap-
peals, the regulator learns its lessons from appeal decisions, and as it internalizes these
experiences and adjusts its decision making practice, the regulator is increasingly held
accountable through the threat of judicial review and less through actual court decisions.
While this model might look quite appealing, we realize that reality looks quite different
in most countries: Some regulators continue to lose a high percentage of their cases on
appeal, and if anything it would appear that litigating decisions of regulators has become
the standard. We find it difficult to develop a completely satisfactory answer. On the
one hand, the model of accountability through internalizing mechanisms and the threat
of judicial review should be examined more carefully in order to explore whether judi-
cial accountability can be reconciled with their view that accountability is best explained
by transparency and publication mechanisms. On the other hand, it could also be that
courts hold regulators accountable through their ability to sanction, which in practice
they also do quite frequently, even if that means that the view that accountability works
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Table 3.1.: Accountability: our working definition
Accountability A regulator is accountable with respect to its past actions
and future intentions when national or European politicians,
or market players, or members of the public, or judicial au-
thorities, can require the regulator to inform and to explain
and/or justify its conduct with respect to those actions and
intentions.
Note: based on the definition found in Philp (2009)
without sanctioning mechanisms does not extend all the way to courts. We do note that
while these questions are conceptually interesting and important, they do not affect the
empirical work and the results of our study.
3.2. Mapping the stages of accountability
Our initial selection of accountability criteria was complicated by the fact that there ap-
pears to be less agreement in the political science literature on which criteria should
be considered when determining the degree of a regulator’s accountability, and a much
of a less systematic treatment of accountability in legal sources. In creating our list of
accountability criteria, we sought to include criteria for each of the five main groups of
principals: political institutions; other stakeholders/the public; courts; European insti-
tutions; and peers. For each group, we identified criteria that are regularly mentioned
in political science and legal sources, although it was much more difficult here to dis-
criminate among criteria in order to include only those that could be identified as ‘core’
elements. These difficulties explain why our initial list of accountability criteria wasmuch
longer than our initial independence criteria list.
The following table provides an overview of the accountability criteria we found, to-
gether with an indication of the principal(s) which immediately benefit from it. The table
regroups the criteria into four stages, which are introduced further below. It also al-
ready provides an indication of those criteria which, while relevant, were not used in the
assessment, for various reasons (as explained below).
3.2.1. Criteria where all regulators score the same
The technique used in this section is similar to the technique used earlier to measure
levels of independence and the contribution of each item to overall independence. Be-
cause this technique exploits variation between the responses of different regulators, it
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Presence of defined regulatory objectives X X X X X X
Objectives explained to stakeholders X X X X X X
Reasoned decisions X X X X X X
Procedural rules in place X X X
*Advisory body with stakeholder participation X X
Information stage
Report to Commission X
Retrospective annual report X X X X X
Press releases X X X X X
Voluntary information provision X X
Discovery stage
Compulsory/compelled information provision X X
Appearance before parliamentary Committee X
Public consultations X X
Annual reports publicly available X X
Data underlying decisions publicly available X X
Evaluation stage
Prospective annual plan X X
Code of conduct X X
Periodic performance evaluation X X
Possibility of Commission intervention X
Appeal before judiciary X X
Membership in peer network X
**Prior ministerial approval for annual plan X
**Minister can issue guidelines to regulator X
**Minister can dismiss head of regulator X
* Not used in the assessment, since all regulators score the same.
** Not used in the assessment, because of high threshold value.
*** Not used in the assessment, because of low discrimination parameter (low influence on accountability
score).
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is unable to ‘score’ items where all regulators in the sample have the same response.
Three items in our index – whether the objectives of regulatory policies are defined,
with priorities, whether or not the decision-making of the regulator was transparent, and
whether or not the regulator belongs to a horizontal network – do not have any varia-
tion. Therefore, on the basis of the empirical data, we cannot say how much having
defined regulatory objectives, or membership of a horizontal network, contributes to
accountability.
The fact that we cannot ‘score’ these items does not mean that they are not important
for accountability. Indeed, it may be that these items are fundamental for accountability.
Having defined regulatory objectives might be such a basic element of accountability
that it is a characteristic of all regulators in our sample, even those which score poorly
on other characteristics.
3.2.2. Preliminary analysis: criteria with low discrimination parameters or
high threshold values
Having excluded these three items because of lack of variation, we conduct a prelim-
inary analysis of the data using a two-parameter item response model. This model is
explained in full in the technical appendix. Just as before, we estimated thresholds for
each item, and a number of discrimination parameters. These thresholds and discrimi-
nation parameters can be interpreted in the same way as before. That is, the threshold
for a given item is the point on the scale at which the regulator is as likely to respond in a
given high-accountability category as it is to respond in the low-accountability category.
Here, the interpretation of the thresholds is made easier because we are dealing with
items which either feature or do not feature; regulators which score close to the thresh-
old are as likely to have a given accountability-promoting feature as they are to lack
that feature. The discrimination parameter measures roughly how important having this
item is to the regulator’s overall score for accountability. High discrimination parameters
indicate items that are particularly important for accountability.
When we conducted this preliminary analysis, we found that three items had very small
or negative discrimination parameters. The items affected were:
• whether or not the minister may reject the regulator’s annual plan or budget;
• whether or not the minister may issue general guidelines concerning the regula-
tor’s work; and
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• whether the minister can dismiss the head of the regulatory for performance-
related reasons.
Negative discrimination parameters sometimes arise when conducting this kind of anal-
ysis. They may mean either that the item is unrelated to the latent trait we are trying to
measure, or that although the item is related to the latent trait we are trying to measure,
it is related in precisely the opposite direction to that which we predicted. Given that
there are no strong reasons for suspecting that items are related in the opposite way to
that predicted, we view the former possibility as more likely. It is also worth noting that
two of these items, concerning ministerial instructions and the possibility of dismissal of
the head of the regulator, also feature in our index of independence. Our finding that
these two items are unrelated to accountability but negatively related to independence
may indicate that indeed, the type of measures where independence and accountability
would theoretically be in direct conflict are in fact not necessary for accountability to be
ensured.
Furthermore, we also leave aside one item pertaining to whether or not the regulator
had an advisory body. The threshold for this item, at 19.565, was extremely high, and
including it in the plot made it difficult to display the range of the remaining values. As is
discussed below, the high threshold associated with this item is related to the extremely
low discrimination parameter, suggesting that whilst this item is an indicator of high
accountability, it is a very unreliable one.
3.2.3. Remaining accountability criteria
Thus, having excluded three criteria because of lack of relationship to the overall trait
of accountability, and one because of a too high threshold value, we were left with
seventeen items relating to accountability. These items, and their associated thresholds
and discrimination parameters, are presented in more detail in Figure 3.1.
We begin by discussing the bottom two items shown in Figure 3.1, namely whether
or not the Commission can intervene before decisions are adopted or finalized (Com-
mission Intervention) and whether or not judicial appeals with full review are permitted
(Judicial Appeal). Both of these items have extremely low thresholds, which means
that ordinarily we would expect that even regulators which lack other mechanisms of
providing accountability would have these items. Having said this, the discrimination
parameters attached to these items are amongst the lowest in our index of seventeen
items, suggesting that these items may not be as essential to accountability as other
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Whether or not the commission can intervene before deci-
sions are adopted/finalized








Whether or not reasoned decisions are published
Procedural Rules Whether or not there are public rules on procedures and
participation in decisions and rule making
Commission Re-
ports




Whether or not the regulator presents (retrospective) annual
reports and financial statements
Press releases Whether or not the regulator issues press releases and
newsletters reporting on its work
Voluntary Infor-
mation
Whether or not the regulator may provide information to a
minister, or the parliament, voluntarily at its own discretion
Request Informa-
tion
Whether or not the regulator must provide information to a
minister, or the parliament, upon request
Parl. Committee Whether or not the regulator must periodically appear be-
fore a parliamentary committee to answer questions
Public Consulta-
tion
Whether or not the agency conducts public consultations
with feedback opportunities
Public Reports Whether or not the agency makes its annual reports publicly
available




Whether or not a (prospective) annual plan and budget are
submitted to political authorities
Code of conduct Whether or not the agency has a code of conduct/ guidelines
Performance
Eval.
Whether or not the agency is subject to periodic perfor-
mance evaluation
Advisory Body Whether or not the agency has an advisory body with stake
holder participation
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Note: Plotted positions refer to the threshold where two adjacent options are equally likely.
The number plotted in the right-hand side of the map is the discrimination parameter. See text
for a description of the discrimination parameter. Note also that the threshold for Advisory Body
is not plotted. See text for explanation.
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items. As indicated before, if transparency and disclosure mechanisms function well,
it may be that formal sanctions (by the Commission and by the judiciary) are less fre-
quently applied and thus become less significant in ensuring accountability.10
The next set of items largely concerns procedural rules concerning the operation of
the regulator, and in particular the way in which the operator explains itself to regula-
tees and to the Commission. These four items – whether or not strategies and policy
goals are explained to stakeholders (Objectives Explained), whether or not reasoned
decisions are published (Reasoned Decisions), whether or not there are rules on proce-
dures and participation in decisions and rule making (Procedural Rules), and whether
or not the regulator reports to the European Commission (Commission Reports) – all
have relatively low thresholds. What is more, with the exception of the item relating to
reporting to the European Commission, they all discriminate fairly well between regu-
lators with similar levels of accountability. The lower discriminatory ability of the item
relating to reporting to the European Commission is likely to reflect a difference between
sectors rather than a real difference between comparatively accountable and compar-
atively unaccountable regulators. We would therefore suggest that these four items
constitute the first major milestone on the road to accountability, and should be treated
as a package.
The next three items all concern the ways in which the regulator communicates infor-
mation to the outside world. All three items concern basic ways in which the regulator
may be held accountable by other actors (politicians, stakeholders, the broader public)
acting on information released by the regulator. Whether or not the regulator presents
its annual reports and financial statements to political institutions (Present Annual Plan)
and whether or not the regulator issues press releases/newsletters to interested par-
ties (Press Releases) are two basic ways in which the regulator communicates; the
regulator may also go beyond this, and provide information to parliament and to the
minister according to a reporting schedule of its own devising (Voluntary Information), a
step which although it is similarly demanding in terms of its threshold, is ultimately more
discriminating than either of the two provisions concerning mandatory reporting and
communications activity. Nevertheless, these three items pertaining to communication
follow basic provisions concerning procedure, and form a second package relating to
accountability mechanisms.
These two packages, concerning procedural rules and communications respectively,
10 We suggest in our conclusion that what may matter is not the brute fact of participation in judicial
processes, but rather the quality of such participation.
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are followed by another less tightly clustered package concerning the information upon
which the regulator bases its decisions – which perforce includes a strong commu-
nications element. The first of these items concerns whether or not the sponsoring
minister and/or the parliament may request information of the regulator (Request Infor-
mation). Like the next item along, concerning whether or not the regulator is obliged to
appear before relevant parliamentary committees and answer questions (Parl Cttee),
this item discriminates reasonably well – but not as well as the next three items, which
concern, respectively, whether or not the regulator consults the public (Public Consul-
tation), whether or not the annual reports of the regulator are made publicly available
and readily accessible (Public Reports), and whether or not the data underlying the
regulator’s decision is also made public (Underlying Data). These three items have the
highest discrimination parameters of any items in our index, and effectively separate
high- from low-accountability regulators.
The remaining items in our index concern different ways in which regulators may set
standards for themselves upon which basis they will later be evaluated. The first of
these items concerns whether or not the regulator submits a (prospective) annual plan
of work, as distinct from a (retrospective) annual report. This item discriminates well, es-
pecially in comparison to the next item, concerning whether or not the regulator follows
a code of conduct, or guidelines for its operations (Code Of Conduct), which, although
more demanding, is less discriminating than the previous item. The last item which reli-
ably discriminates between regulators concerns whether or not the regulator is subject
to periodic performance evaluation (Performance Eval). This is the most demanding
item, with the exception of whether or not the regulator has an advisory body. This last
item has a very high threshold, but has such a low discrimination parameter that its
impact on overall scores for accountability is negligible, and indeed calls into question
the relevance of this item to the overall index.
This brief discussion of eighteen index items related to accountability, the ’difficulty’ of
these items, and the degree to which these items discriminate between regulators with
otherwise-similar levels of accountability, strongly suggests that accountability proceeds
in four schematic stages:
• a procedural stage, in which the regulator must state the rules on the basis of
which it is to be held accountable, and demonstrate that it is following these rules;
• an information stage, in which the stakeholders – both political actors and the
wider public – acquire the information to hold the regulator accountable for its
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actions;
• a discovery stage, in which stakeholders – again including political actors and the
public – may, through the examination of select information, examine particular
actions of the regulator; and
• an evaluation stage, in which the regulator states the objectives on the basis of
which it is to be held accountable, and is subject to evaluation on this basis.
Interestingly, this four-stage schematic overview of accountability is without sanctioning
elements. Political scientists have debated whether or not the prospect of being sanc-
tioned by a given actor is an inherent part of being accountable to that same actor. As
announced above, this index suggests that accountability can exist largely on the basis
of disclosure of information alone. That may provide an explanation why, as we discuss
later, there is a positive relationship between accountability and independence.
3.3. Mapping the regulators
Just as before with our model of independence, the same model that we used to find
out the relative ordering of items relating to accountability can also be used to produce
estimates of the accountability of each regulator. Once again, we present these esti-
mates alongside indications of the uncertainty surrounding each estimate. Whilst there
is greater separation between regulators in terms of accountability than there is in terms
of independence, the results must still be interpreted cautiously. These estimates of ac-
countability are provided in Figure 3.2. As before, 95% confidence intervals are also
plotted.
The estimates of accountability grow increasingly imprecise as we move from low ac-
countability to high accountability.
Of the three regulators with the lowest levels of accountability, two – ARAF and SRTF
– deal with the regulation of railways. We can be highly confident that these regula-
tors have lower levels of accountability than the other regulators in the sample. Both
agencies are quite young, which may partly explain why they have less developed ac-
countability mechanisms and score lower on our map.11
Though we cannot be equally confident, it is probable that the next group of regulators
11 ARAF, for example, has not yet published an annual report because it has been so recently established.
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– the two French regulators in telecoms and competition respectively, and the German
Bundeskartellamt and Bundesnetzagentur – are in the bottom half of the sample when it
comes to accountability. The accountability of this group of four regulators is surrounded
by comparatively little uncertainty.
The same cannot be said for the two energy regulators, the CRE and the CREG. Our
estimates of accountability for these two regulators are subject to considerable uncer-
tainty.
The top seven regulators fall into two groups of regulators, each impossible to judge
between. The first group is composed of the ORR, the Dutch OPTA, and the Belgian
IBPT. The second group is composed of the three remaining British regulators, and the
Dutch competition authority.
3.4. Conclusion
In this section we have discussed the concept of accountability, and how it might be
measured. Setting out with an initial stock of some twenty-three items, we noted that
some items were not appropriate to include in an index of accountability comparing the
regulators in our sample. We then estimated a model which calculated the contribution
of each of these items to regulators’ accountability. We suggested that these items
could be grouped into four different stages of accountability: a procedural stage, an
information stage, a discovery stage, and an evaluation stage.
We concluded by presenting the accountability scores of the sixteen regulators in our
sample, noting where relevant the difficulties in reliably distinguishing between regula-
tors with similar levels of accountability.
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4. Perceived quality
This section describes the results of a peer benchmarking exercise carried out at work-
shops organised by the Centre for Regulation in Europe (CERRE) on 29 September.
The object of the exercise was to elicit attendees’ perceptions of the quality of regulators
in four sectors – competition, energy, rail and telecoms – in five countries – Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The section starts by
describing how attendees’ perceptions were elicited, before giving some descriptive in-
formation concerning the responses and their consistency. The section then goes on
to describe how the perceptions of the attendees can be turned into an overall ranking
of perceived quality of the regulators, and how this ranking can be adjusted for biases
that respondents may have. The section concludes by showing how perceived quality
varies according to country and sector.
4.1. Conceptual clarification
As Radaelli (2004) noted,
The concept of quality has now become a fundamental component of reg-
ulatory reform and regulatory management in a large number of countries.
‘Quality’ features in all initiatives for better regulation launched by the OECD
and the European Union. EU institutions such as the Council and the Euro-
pean Commission have opted for a basic definition of ‘high quality regula-
tion’. Efficient, effective, coherent, and simple (that is, easy to understand)
regulation is high quality regulation – [as] the Commission argues in its offi-
cial publications … and even in its own tenders.
However, the fact that quality is much discussed does not mean that quality is well
defined. As Radaelli goes on to note, quality is associated with a variety of charac-
teristics. ‘High quality’ regulatory work is, variously, work that is efficient (both in its
own production and in its consequences for regulated markets), proportionate, legiti-
mate, consistent, not unduly prescriptive, and enforceable. That is, quality is made up
of many potentially rivalrous components.
In this report, we do not specify the precise number and weighting of all of these com-
ponents of quality. Whilst such a work might be possible, we do not believe that it is
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appropriate here. Instead, we rely on a notion of perceived quality. Specifically, reg-
ulator X has greater perceived quality than regulator Y if competent experts choose X
over Y when asked which regulator does better work. In relying on perceived qual-
ity, we short-circuit the question of the different components of quality, and allow our
competent experts to silently weight these different components when they make their
comparison.
Because we rely on perceived quality, it is possible that our judgements of quality might
not be convergent. In particular, experts judging the quality of two regulators might
make judgements in part based on their own positions and interests. For example: reg-
ulated actors might place great weight on the efficiency and prescriptive character of
‘quality regulatory work’. Regulators, on the other hand, might place great weight on
the coherence and effectiveness of ‘quality regulatory work’. Academics studying reg-
ulation, finally, might place great weight on the proportionality and legitimacy of ‘quality
regulatory work’. In other words, relying on perceptions of quality might mean that our
measures are purely subjective, rather than inter-subjective.
In what follows, we try and account for this possibility, and discuss perceptions of quality
across the three groups of experts we asked: regulators, regulatees, and academics.
We show that responses are consistent across groups. We then go on to discuss the
particular model that we use to combine expert judgements of the quality of regula-
tors. We then present estimates of perceived quality for each regulator – the result of
our combining expert judgements. Before this, we briefly discuss the manner in which
expert judgements were solicited.
4.2. The set-up
Respondents were asked to take an electronic survey. They first had to indicate their
country, their sector, and their role – whether regulator, regulatee, or academic. Re-
spondents were then asked to compare every pairwise combination of regulators in their
country, and in their sector. Thus, regulatees from the Belgian telecoms sector were
asked to compare all pairwise combinations of the Belgian regulators (Institut Belge
des Services Postaux et des Télécommunications (IBPT), Commission de Régulation
de l’Électricité et du Gaz (CREG), Conseil de la Concurrence (CC), Service de Régu-
lation du Transport Ferroviaire (SRTF)), and all pairwise combinations of the telecoms
regulators in the five countries (IBPT, Autorité de Régulation des Communications Élec-
troniques et des Postes (ARCEP), Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), Onafhankelijke Post
en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA), Office of Communications (Ofcom)). Respon-
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Figure 4.1.: Screen shown to respondents
dents from the Belgian telecoms sector would therefore be asked to make sixteen dif-
ferent pairwise comparisons.
This second group of comparisons between regulators operating in different countries
was necessary in order that all of the regulators in the sample could be placed on a
comparable scale. Otherwise, we would have had a series of national league-tables,
with no indication of how these national figures corresponded to one another.
An example of the prompt given to respondents is shown in Figure 4.1. The question
given to respondents – Which regulator does better work? – was deliberately short and
provocative. Respondents had four options in responding to this prompt. They could
indicate that one of the two regulators shown did the better work; that both regulators
were equally good; or that they did not have enough information to judge.
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The total number of comparisons made by each respondent thus depended on the num-
ber of regulators in their country and upon the number of regulators in their sector.
Belgian or British respondents could expect to make 6 of the possible pairwise com-
binations between the four British/Belgian regulators, and 10 of the possible pairwise
combinations between the different regulators in their sector. Dutch or German respon-
dents could expect to make a single pairwise comparison within their country, and 10
of the possible pairwise combinations between the different regulators in their sector.
4.3. The respondents
Table 4.1 summarizes a number of basic details regarding the number of responses
and the number of comparisons. ‘Valid responses’ are simply those responses where
the respondent chose one regulator over another, or said both regulators were equally





Average valid comparisons per respondent 11.7
% valid comparisons per respondent 76.2
(Min, max) (18.8, 100)
In terms of the composition of respondents, the most popular sectors were Rail (11
respondents), Telecoms (10 respondents), and Energy (7 respondents).
The most represented countries were Belgium (15 respondents), United Kingdom (9
respondents), and France (6 respondents). The ratio between academics, regulatees,
and regulators was 7:16:11.
We can see more clearly the number of comparisons between the different regulators in
Table 4.2, which shows the number of pairwise contests between each regulator. The
table is symmetric, so the entry in row i, column j is equal to the entry in row j, column
i.
4.4. Respondents’ consistency and reliability
Consistency and reliability are two key issues when eliciting judgements from multiple





























































































































































































































of respondents to rank regulators such that, if they prefer A to B, and B to C, then
they also prefer A to C. By reliability, we mean the ability of respondents to give similar
judgements when presented with the same comparison. If respondents are inconsistent
and/or unreliable, and if this inconsistency or lack of reliability is not the result of system-
atic factors which can be accounted for, then our overall results concerning perceived
regulatory quality may be called into question.
Accordingly, in this section we present diagnostic statistics on the consistency and reli-
ability of respondents. We use these statistics later when we present our overall results
on perceived regulatory quality. Specifically, we show that neither (a) excluding unreli-
able respondents nor (b) positively weighting consistent respondents affect our overall
results.
4.4.1. Consistency
Our working assumption in this exercise is that participants at CERRE meetings are
highly knowledgeable about regulatory activity in their country and in their sector. They
ought, therefore, to be able to compare regulators and make informed comparisons
between them. Sometimes, however, respondents may have knowledge of sectoral
regulators in only one or two countries; or they may not have knowledge of certain reg-
ulators in their own country. In this situation, respondents may either answer truthfully
that they do not know enough to compare the two regulators (an option taken in 23.9%
of comparisons), or they may guess which regulator is better. In extreme cases, re-
spondents may answer questions entirely at random. This would hardly deliver credible
results.
In order to test for uninformed responses, we can examine the consistency of respon-
dents’ pairwise comparisons. If respondents are choosing regulators at random, or if
they know very little about the regulators they are being asked to choose between, then
we would expect to see what are known as circular triads. That is, if we have three
regulators, A, B, C, and respondents have strict preferences (that is, they either prefer
A to B: A  B or B  A), then we might see patterns of the form
A  B  C  A
demonstrating inconsistency.
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In order to quantify the degree of (in)consistency, we may make use of Kendall’s coeffi-
cient of consistence ζ (Kendall and Smith, 1940). The calculation of Kendall’s ζ, and in
particular the way in which we accounted for the possibility of ties and the presence of
missing data, are described fully in the appendix. These ζ values we calculate can be
used to test whether inconsistencies in the response patterns are there by chance, or
whether we can conclude that the respondent was choosing regulators at random.
Possible values of ζ are between zero and one. Higher values of ζ indicate greater
consistency. The average value of ζ, 0.57, indicates moderate to high consistency.
Although they are not reported here, statistical tests on these ζ values showed that the
null hypothesis could not be rejected for any respondent. That is, we cannot conclude
that respondents were choosing regulators at random. Consequently, there are no good
grounds for excluding respondents on the basis of inconsistency.
Although we cannot exclude respondents on the basis of inconsistency, we may still be
interested in relative levels of (in)consistency. Analysis of Table A.1 shows that
• Academics are on average more consistent than regulatees, who in turn are more
consistent than regulators (0.63:0.59:0.51). These differences, however, are not
statistically significant (F-value of 1.51 on 2 degrees of freedom; p-value of 0.24).
• Respondents from the Energy sector are on average more consistent (0.63) than
respondents from the Rail sector (0.6), who in turn are more consistent than re-
spondents from the Telecoms sector (0.57). Respondents from the Competition
sector are last, with an average consistency of 0.45. Again, however, these dif-
ferences are not statistically significant (F-value of 1.86 on 3 degrees of freedom;
p-value of 0.16).
4.4.2. Reliability
It is possible for respondents to be consistent, but still be very bad judges. Respondents
might, for example, consistently rate regulators in the opposite way to that given by all
other respondents. In order to test this, we can calculate measures of inter-respondent
reliability.
Specifically, we can calculate values of Cohen’s kappa statistic (Cohen, 1960) for each
pair of respondents, and then calculate the average reliability level across all pairs of
respondents. Using a statistic such as Cohen’s kappa is preferable to using simpler
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measures of agreement, such as the percentage of occasions on which respondents
agreed. Raw measures such as this fail to take account of the possibility that respon-
dents might agree by chance, and also that the three response categories are ordered,
so that disagreement between one rater who prefers A to B, and another rater who
judges them to be equally good, is less than the disagreement between one rater who
prefers A to B and another rater who prefers B to A.
Cohen’s kappa has a maximum value of one, which indicates perfect agreement. Val-
ues of zero indicate that the observed agreement between two raters is no better than
chance. Values of less than zero indicate that raters actively disagree with each other.
Specifying acceptable levels of kappa is difficult because the values of kappa them-
selves change based on the number of possible responses open to raters. However,
one rule-of-thumb scale is provided by Landis and Koch (1977), and is listed in Table
4.3.
Table 4.3.: Kappa: rules of thumb
κ < 0 No agreement
0 < κ < 0.2 Slight agreement
0.21 < κ < 0.4 Fair agreement
0.41 < κ < 0.6 Moderate agreement
0.61 < κ < 0.8 Substantial agreement
0.81 < κ < 1 Near-perfect agreement
For our data, the value of kappa averaged out over all rater pairs is 0.22, indicating
fair agreement. However, it would clearly be desirable if we could improve the level of
reliability between respondents.
One strategy for doing so is to eliminate respondents progressively based on their con-
tribution to the average value of kappa. That is, for each respondent we calculate the
value of kappa which would obtain if that respondent was not included. We then iden-
tify the largest improvement in kappa, and remove the associated respondent. By pro-
ceeding iteratively, we can identify a subset of respondents who are collectively more
reliable.
Here, we adopt a threshold of κ = 0.4, which is equivalent to requiring moderate agree-
ment of our respondents. By proceeding iteratively, we identify ten respondents who
drag down the value of kappa most.
Note that these respondents are not necessarily the least consistent respondents. Some
of these respondents are extremely consistent when rating regulators. However, they
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drag down the reliability statistic because their consistent judgements are at odds with
the rest of the group. This may be because they are, in some sense, poorer judges; or
it may be because their judgements are affected by particular structural factors which
we identify later.
4.4.3. Strategies for dealing with consistency and reliability
In the two preceding sections, we tested for consistency and reliability. In the first case,
we could not reject any respondents for statistically significant levels of inconsistency.
In the second case, we were able to identify ten respondents whose responses dragged
our reliability statistic below a certain arbitrary level. In neither case are there conclu-
sive reasons for excluding participants. Additionally, when considering reliability, it is
possible that levels of disagreement could reflect structural characteristics which can
be accounted for.
Our strategy for dealing with consistency and reliability is therefore to perform all of our
analyses four times:
• on the full data-set;
• on the full data-set, but weighting all responses by respondents’ levels of consis-
tency, as measured by their ζ-statistic;
• on a restricted data-set, excluding the ten respondents most responsible for low
levels of κ;
• on a restricted data-set, excluding the ten respondents most responsible for low
levels of κ, and weighting the remaining responses by respondents’ levels of con-
sistency, as measured by their ζ-statistic;
and then to demonstrate that these different analyses deliver substantially the same
conclusions about the relative perceived quality of regulators.
4.5. Modelling perceived quality: baseline model
We can analyse this pattern of pairwise comparisons to establish a general ranking of
regulators’ perceived quality. This ranking will naturally be very uncertain, given the
limited number of respondents, the possibility for respondents to compare regulators
on their basis of their own subjective criteria, and the possibility of certain types of re-
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spondent bias. In this section, we present first a baseline model of the perceived quality
of regulators, before moving on to test for respondent bias.
The model we use to analyze this pattern is called a Bradley-Terry model (Bradley and
Terry, 1952). These models estimate the probability of one contestant, i with a given
level of quality (λi) beating another contestant, j.
logit[Pr(ibeatsj)] = λi − λj
Here, our contestants are regulators, and the contest is the pairwise comparison made
by the respondent. The greater the difference between the quality of regulator i and the
quality of regulator j, the more likely it is that regulator i will ‘beat’ j, or, equivalently, be
chosen by our experts. By maximum likelihood estimation techniques, we can find, for
each regulator, the value of λ that makes the observed pattern of ‘victories’ and ‘defeats’
(that is, the observed pattern of expert choices) most probable.
These estimated values are point estimates, but they come with a degree of uncertainty.
Consequently, it is important to interpret them with due diligence.
Figure 4.2 shows the value of regulators’ perceived quality in this baseline model, using
the full data-set. For each regulator, we plot the point estimate of the regulator’s quality
(given by the dot) as well as the 90% confidence interval. Thus, we can be 90% con-
fident that the true value of the regulator’s quality lies within this range. There is one
exception: regulator C is used as the reference category, and its value is set to zero.
(This has no implications for Regulator C’s relative position: were it really perceived to
be the best, the values of the other regulators would all be below zero). No confidence
interval is given.
We can see that some regulators have broader confidence intervals than others. This
may reflect either the fact that respondents were genuinely uncertain about how to judge
the quality of these regulators, or that these regulators were involved in a limited number
of comparisons (this is the case for the German regulators, for example).
In terms of the separation between the regulators, we can be very confident that there
are differences between the top four regulators and the bottom four regulators; the rank-
ing of the middle-placed regulators, although still most likely to be in the order given, is
more uncertain given the way in which the confidence intervals overlap.
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The figures presented in Figure 4.2 show the parameters as estimated on the full data-
set, weighting all respondents equally. However, as noted earlier, concerns about re-
spondent reliability and consistency mean that it is important to test whether these re-
sults are robust to alternate specifications, in particular alternate specifications which
exclude ‘unreliable’ respondents and place greater weight on consistent respondents.
A scatter-plot matrix of these alternate measures is shown in Figure 4.3, which plots
the results under the four different specifications discussed above: the full data-set, the
data-set weighted by respondent consistency, a restricted data-set excluding ten ‘un-
reliable’ respondents, and a restricted data-set weighted by respondent consistency.
The scatter-plot matrix shows that these alternate specifications barely affect the order
and relative positiong of the sixteen regulators. All of the correlations between these
variables are extremely high, at greater than 0.9. The only outlier is Regulator M, which
receives a higher rating in the full analysis than it does in the restricted analyses.
Given the high correlations between these different measures, and since measures cal-
culated on the full data-set are more efficient (have narrower confidence intervals) than
measures calculated on the restricted data-set, only measures based on the full data-
set are plotted here; all substantive interpretations of these measures refer to measures
calculated on the full data-set.
4.6. Modelling perceived quality: biases
The estimates presented in Figure 4.2 assume that respondents are unbiased (though
perhaps noisy) judges of quality. However, it is possible that respondents suffer from
a number of biases. In advance planning for this exercise, we identified a number of
potential biases which it would be wise to control for:
• ‘Regulator-boosting’: respondents working for regulators will be more likely to
choose their employer over any other organisation, irrespective of the true level
of quality;
• ‘Regulatee bashing’: respondents working for regulated organizations will bemore
likely to choose any other organisation over ‘their’ regulator, irrespective of the true
level of quality. This may be because regulatees wish to discredit their regulators,
or simply (and more likely) because they believe the grass is greener elsewhere;
• ‘Nationalism’: respondents from country A will be more likely to choose organisa-
tions from their country over organisations from any other country, irrespective of
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Figure 4.3.: Regulator perceived quality, alternate specifications
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the true level of quality.
These biases can be incorporated in to the Bradley-Terry model by simply adding an
additional parameter which captures this effect. Thus,
logit[Pr(ibeatsj)] = λi − λj + δZ
where Z is a matrix with columns representing non-player specific advantages, rows
representing contests, and cell entries taking a value of 1 if player i has the advantage,
and -1 if player j has it. Thus, if we are testing for regulator-boosting, then the entry in the
appropriate cell in Z would be ‘1’ if the respondent works for the first-named regulator,
‘-1’ if the respondent works for the second-named regulator, and zero otherwise.
Table 4.4 shows estimates of the size of these biases, along with tests for statistical
significance. We discuss each of these in turn.
Table 4.4.: Sources of bias
Bias Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
1 Nationalism 0.48 0.35 1.36 0.17
2 Boosting 1.52 0.46 3.28 0.00
3 Bashing 0.37 0.37 1.01 0.31
4.6.1. Nationalism
When we test for nationalism, we expected a positive coefficient. The coefficient re-
ported in Table 4.4 is indeed positive, but is not statistically significant at standard lev-
els of significance. This may result from differences in nationalism across respondents.
Specifically, respondents from some countries may have very high views of regulatory
quality in their own countries, whilst respondents of other countries may have a very
pessimistic view. Britons, for example, may be very bullish about regulatory quality
in the UK compared to other respondents, whilst Dutch respondents (of which they
were fewer in our sample) may be particularly pessimistic about regulatory quality in
the Netherlands.12 Other effects may also be at work. Respondents may simply know
more about regulators in their country – which would not necessarily have a strong net
positive or negative effect on pairwise comparisons. Because the coefficient is not sta-
12 This example is only illustrative: we are not suggesting that this is in fact the case.
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tistically significant, and because uneven responses like this are eminently possible, we
do not correct for this particular bias.
4.6.2. Regulator-boosting
When we test for regulator-boosting, we can see from Table 4.4 that respondents do
suffer from bias when answering questions about their own regulator. The effect is
positive (that is, respondents are more likely to find in favour of their own regulator)
and significant. The effect is also quite large: if the only respondents we listened to
were biased in this way, then a regulator might shift from the bottom quartile of Figure
4.2 to the top quartile. Fortunately, responses affected by this bias are a minority of
total responses, and there is no reason to suggest that respondents boosting their own
regulators are biased when evaluating contests in which they have no stake.
4.6.3. Regulatee bashing
When we test for regulatee bashing, we expected to see a negative coefficient in Table
4.4. That is, we expected regulatees to be less likely to choose their own regulator.
In fact, regulatees are more likely to choose their own regulator in national or sectoral
comparison. Note though that this effect is not sigificant, and thus will not be taken into
consideration at this stage.
4.6.4. Corrected results
Figure 4.4 shows results corrected for the ‘boosting’ bias. The major loser from this cor-
rection is regulator M, which loses 0.28 points. The major beneficiary from this correc-
tion is regulator N, which gains 0.41 points. The correlation between the two measures
(the corrected estimates and the original, uncorrected estimates) is, however, extremely
high, at 0.99.
Just as before, we can test whether the figures shown in Figure 4.4 are robust to al-
ternate specifications. Figure 4.5 again plots a scatterplot matrix of the measures of
perceived quality as calculated using different sets of data. Once again, the correla-
tions between different types of measure are extremely high, and greater than 0.9.
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Figure 4.5.: Regulator perceived quality, alternate specifications
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4.7. Discussion of results
If the results shown in Figure 4.4 are reliable indicators of regulators’ perceived quality,
what explains why some regulators are perceived as being of better quality than others?
Whilst a full analysis of this will follow with our measures of independence and account-
ability, we can show how perceived quality varies according to country and sector.
Figure 4.6 first shows how regulators’ perceived quality varies by country. The UK is
considerably ahead of all other countries, followed by the Netherlands and Germany,
though in these two cases we can only base our conclusions on the two multisectoral
regulators in these countries.
Figure 4.7 then shows how regulators’ perceived quality varies by sector. The disparities
between sectors are less marked than the disparities between country. More specifi-
cally, whilst there is a statistically significant difference between the perceived quality
of regulators according to country (F-value of 4.33 on 4 degrees of freedom, p = 0.02),
the same cannot be said of quality by sector (F-value of 1.31 on 3 degrees of freedom,
p = 0.32). Nevertheless, Telecoms edges out Competition, which in turn is ahead of
Energy. Rail is the last placed sector.
These indicative results are a precursor to a fuller analysis of perceived quality accord-
ing to the independence and accountability of regulators. For the moment, it suffices to
restate the main points of this chapter.
We have presented an overview of an exercise designed to elicit the perceived quality of
regulators in five countries and four different sectors. We have shown that experts are
fairly consistent in their pairwise comparisons of regulators. We have modelled these
pairwise comparisons using a Bradley-Terry model, and presented initial results of the
perceived quality of regulators. We have then tested for the presence of three possible
biases when using such data, and have presented corrected results which account for
the regulator-boosting seen in the data.
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5. Empirical links between independence, accountability and
perceived quality
In this section, we discuss the links between independence, accountability and per-
ceived quality – though our main focus is on explaining levels of perceived quality. We
begin by discussing a potential confounder, namely the resources available to each
regulator. We discuss how to measure this, before moving on to show the bivariate
relationships between each of the three main features we are interested in, plus levels
of resources. We then present a series of linear regression models which attempt to
take account of multiple variables at a time. We close by discussing the implications of
these models.
5.1. Regulator resources
Earlier, we discussed differences in the perceived quality of regulators, as revealed by
pairwise evaluations made by regulators, regulatees, and academics. One potential
explanation of these differences lies in the resources available to each regulator. Some
of the regulators we consider here have very large budgets in absolute terms, whereas
some have rather small budgets. It is possible that these differences are driving dif-
ferences in perceived quality, either because funding really does matter for quality, or
because those comparing regulators opt for the larger, better-funded, or more visible,
regulator. Whilst the link between funding and quality of work seems intuitive – more
money can pay for more comprehensive and better economic and legal analysis – we
cannot rule out the second possibility.
We will therefore examine the connection between the resources available to each reg-
ulator, and its perceived quality. Note that we examine the resources available to each
regulator in an absolute sense. That is, we make no attempt to evaluate whether the
resources available to each regulator are in any way ‘adequate’ to the tasks and compe-
tences it has been assigned. Multisectoral regulators are likely to have larger budgets
than single-sector regulators, but the increase in funding may not be proportionate to
the increase in competences.
To measure and make comparable the resources available to each regulator, we col-
lected information on the size of the budget, expressed in millions of euros, for each
regulator, and on the number of full-time equivalent staff for each regulator. These fig-
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ures were generally taken from the annual reports of each regulator, and typically refer
to the financial year 2010/11.
We chose to combine these two sources of information to produce an overall measure
of the resources available to each regulator. We did this for two reasons. First, it is
possible that some regulators may choose to operate in either a capital-intensive or
labour-intensive fashion. Taking just information on the budget of the regulator, or on the
number of the staff, might then give a misleading impression of the available resources.
Second, because the number of regulators we are dealing with is limited, there are
technical difficulties involved in including both of these sources of information separately.
Visually, we would not be able to plot simple bivariate relationships between resources
and perceived quality; statistically, including both of these (correlated) variables in a
regression with a limited number of cases would mean that we were unlikely to obtain
unbiased and/or efficient estimates.
Consequently, we produce a single composite measure of resources as follows:
• We took the log of budget (in millions of euros) and staff (in full-time equivalents).
We took the log because both staff and budget show decreasing marginal utility,
and thus increases from a few staff to a moderate number of staff matter more
than increases from a moderate number of staff to a large number of staff;
• We scaled each variable to have the same mean (zero) and the same standard
deviation (one). We did this in order to combine these two variables which are
measured on different scales (euros and persons);
• We took the average of the two figures, and transformed the data so that the
smallest value was equal to minus one, and the largest value was equal to positive
one.
Although we motivated combining these two sources of information in part because we
were worried about capital-intensive or labour-intensive outliers, the Spearman rank
correlation between the two variables of 0.98 is very strong and positive.
Information on this summary measure of resources is plotted in Figure 5.1. It shows
clearly a clustering of seven or eight regulators around the zero point (the mean of our
standardized variable), with a number of outliers to either side.
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5.2. Resources, independence and accountability
It is useful to investigate the relationship between all three of the ‘input’ variables we are
using to explain quality. If all three of these inputs are positively related, then neither
regulators nor policy-makers face any trade-offs in pushing for legislative changes which
might affect resources, independence, or accountability. If, by contrast, some of these
variables are negatively related to each other (as some people have assumed in the
case of independence and accountability), then those decision-makers do indeed face
a trade-off.
Figure 5.2 therefore plots the relationship between these different inputs. The Pearson
correlation of 0.46 between independence and accountability is strong and positive; a
similar figure of 0.46 is obtained for the relationship between independence and re-
sources. The strongest correlation (0.82) is between the degree of accountability and
the quantity of resources available to the regulator. This correlation might suggest that
politicians are happier to disburse money when they believe that they can hold recip-
ients accountable. However, there would be no reason to expect such a relationship
with respect to resources derived from own revenue sources, such as industry levies.
5.3. Quality and inputs
We now turn to discussing the bivariate link between perceived quality and our inputs.
Considering first the link between quality and resources, the Pearson correlation be-
tween the two variables This Pearson correlation of 0.71 is very strong and positive.
If resources were the exclusive non-idiosyncratic determinant of quality, and if quality
was judged correctly by those who compared regulators, then we would have 8 regula-
tors which are delivering better-than-expected performance, and 8 regulators which are
delivering poorer-than-expected performance. The three most over-performing regula-
tors are D (1.49), K (0.91), and G (0.75). Of course, all of these judgements depend
on the assumptions that resources are the exclusive non-idiosyncratic determinant of
quality, an assumption which we presume, in virtue of our emphasis on independence,
to be false. It is to the links between independence and accountability, on the one hand,
and perceived quality, on the other hand, to which we know turn.
The Pearson correlation between these two variables of 0.48 is strong and positive. If
independence was the exclusive non-idiosyncratic determinant of quality, and if quality
was judged correctly by those who compared regulators, then we would have 10 reg-
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Figure 5.2.: Relationship between different inputs
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ulators which are delivering better-than-expected performance, and 6 regulators which
are delivering poorer-than-expected performance. The three most over-performing reg-
ulators are G (1.96), S (1.48), and J (1.25).
Finally, we turn to the bivariate link between quality and accountability. The Pearson
correlation of 0.62 is strong and positive.
5.4. Overall results
Thus far, we have looked at bivariate relationships between quality, on the one hand,
and our three ‘inputs’ on the other hand – resources, independence, and accountability.
We have seen that all three of these inputs are positively related to quality, and indeed
they are all positively related to each other. We can now move on to estimating the
effects of these different inputs when they are considered at the same time.
It is natural to model the impact of these inputs on quality through linear regression.
Accordingly Table 5.1 lists three regression models of quality based on different combi-
nations of the three inputs.
Unfortunately, because of the limited number of regulators in our sample (16), it is both
difficult to achieve results that are statistically significant, and undesirable to include all
three predictors. Most rules of thumb usually suggest between ten and twelve cases
per predictor, a rule of thumb which would permit only bivariate tests of the relationship
between inputs and quality. Nevertheless, the models shown suggest that, across the
three different pairwise combinations of these three inputs, there is a significant rela-
tionship between at least one variable in each model.
Resources have a significant positive impact on quality in the first model, alongside
independence. Resources also have a significant positive impact when considered
alongside accountability, although here the relationship is only significant at the 10%
level. Finally, accountability has a significant positive impact when considered along-
side independence.
None of these models is likely to be the ‘correct’ model of quality, but the three models
taken together do suggest that there are positive relationships between these three
inputs and quality which are not epiphenomenal. In terms of the ‘best’ model, the first
model, relating quality to the resources available to the regulator, and the degree of
independence enjoyed by the regulator, is the most successful at explaining variation
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Table 5.1.: Regression models of quality
(1) (2) (3)








R-squared 0.541 0.515 0.436
adj. R-squared 0.470 0.440 0.350
sigma 1.006 1.034 1.115
F 7.660 6.904 5.031
p 0.006 0.009 0.024
Log-likelihood −21.144 −21.583 −22.787
Deviance 13.167 13.910 16.169
AIC 50.289 51.167 53.574
BIC 53.379 54.257 56.664
N 16 16 16
Note: * = results statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance; † = results significant
at the 0.1 level.
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in quality, able to explain nearly half of the variance in quality, as shown by the adjusted
R2 figure given in the table.
5.5. Conclusions
Webegan this section by discussing in detail one factor whichmight potentially confound
relationships between independence, accountability, and quality, namely the level of re-
sources available to the regulator. We indicated how we measured this, and present
summary information on the resources available to each regulator in our sample. We
then went on to present simple bivariate relationships between the four variables we
are interested in: resources, independence, accountability, and perceived quality. We
showed that all four of these items were positively related, and that the relationships
were statistically significant. In closing, we presented a number of regression mod-
els which attempted to estimate the impact of these variables upon perceived quality,
considered jointly. Although not all of the estimates presented in these models were
significant, this was due to a limited sample size; generally, the results strongly suggest
(but do not confirm) an important relationship between independence and accountabil-
ity, on the one hand, and perceived quality on the other hand, even when these two
variables are considered together.
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
In this section, we summarize our findings. We follow the structure of the report, and
discuss independence, accountability, and perceived quality, before going on to sum-
marize our findings regarding the links between these three properties in greater de-
tail.
In terms of independence, we discussed two main aspects of independence – inde-
pendence from politics and independence frommarket players – and how these aspects
could be considered either de jure or de facto. We then went on to build an index of
independence in terms of several different items. Some of these items could be an-
swered in a simple yes or no fashion. ‘Is the regulator described in law as politically
independent’ would be one example. Some of these items were more complex, and
had multiple possible responses which could be ordered in terms of increasing inde-
pendence. The length of term of the heads or chief executives of regulatory bodies
was one such item, with longer terms corresponding to more independence. Using a
particular statistical model, we mapped these items in terms of their contribution to in-
creasing independence. We gave two numbers for each item: its location, on a scale
from low independence to high independence, and its discrimination: its ability to sep-
arate regulators with otherwise similar levels of regulators. We found that some items
had relatively low locations, such as clear statements of the regulator’s independence,
and a bar on ministerial instructions. We found that other items were much more de-
manding, such as provisions on making renewal of appointments more difficult. We
then used this index to score the independence of the regulators in our sample.
In terms of accountability, we noted that accountability is a relationship between the
regulator and other actors, usually including national politicians and members of the
executive but also potentially including market participants and the public, the judicial
system, and the European level. We then analyzed accountability in a very similar way
to the way in which we analyzed independence. We constructed an index of account-
ability using several different items. We excluded some items from this index because
there was no variation between regulators, which made it impossible to use them in our
index. With the items that were left, we once again ‘mapped’ the location and discrim-
inating ability of each of these items. We were left with an index that included certain
procedural guarantees of accountability as the bedrock of accountability, followed by
provisions regarding the publication of information, provisions regarding discovery pro-
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cedures by politicians and market players, and, finally, provisions regarding the evalua-
tion of the regulator’s work. Once again, we used this index to score the accountability
of the regulators in our sample. In this case, we found that it was much more difficult to
rank regulators in terms of accountability. This greater uncertainty is in part a result of
the model, and in part a result of the regulators we examined. The four UK regulators,
for example, had very similary provisions relating to accountability, which makes it ex-
tremely difficult to differentiate between them, and in turn reduces the variability of the
patterns we see in the data, patterns we exploited to construct our index.
It is interesting to put side by side our findings regarding independence and account-
ability, according to the entity that relates to the regulatory agency.
First of all, as regards market players and other stakeholders, and more broadly the
general public, we see that independence is firmly established since the introduction
of the current regulatory schemes across Europe, while at the same time a number
of accountability measures benefit these actors. Most measures at the four stages
identified in our report (procedural, information, discovery and evaluation) benefit these
actors.
Secondly, as regards the national legislative and executive powers, we can observe
the progressive emergence of a principle of independence of regulatory agencies in
network industries, which has now taken hold in the latest revisions of the electronic
communications and energy directives, in step with recent rulings by European courts.
This slower evolution (compared with the independence from market players) can be
explained in part by difficulties arising from the need to fit independent agencies within
the constitutional and administrative law frameworks of EU Member States. Here the-
ory is taking time to catch up with practice, where regulatory agencies have enjoyed
independence for some time already. In parallel to this longstanding debate, a num-
ber of accountability measures have been put in place, to provide a counterbalance to
independence. Here as well, many of the measures identified in our report – in partic-
ular the production of periodical activity reports, the appearance before parliamentary
committees, the conduct of performance evaluations – create accountability towards
the legislative and executive powers. As we noted, the accountability measures which
would most squarely conflict with the independence of the agency – prior ministerial
approval, the issuance of ministerial guidelines, the dismissal of the head of the agency
by the ministry – are not necessary to create accountability. In other words, a high
level of accountability does not need to come at the expense of independence. In the
end, accountability is ensured without the need for hard sanctions from the legislative
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or executive power.
Thirdly, as regards the national judiciary power (national courts), we note that a num-
ber of accountability measures, especially at the procedural stage, benefit the judiciary.
In contrast with the legislative or executive, however, the judiciary holds the power to
sanction the regulatory agency through judicial review, and that power has been, and
continues to be, used across the Member States and sectors surveyed in this report. At
the same time, neither European nor Member State law provides for independence of
the regulatory agency from the judiciary. At first sight, the relationship with the judiciary
– with respect to both accountability and independence – seems to be at variance with
what was outlined in the previous paragraphs regarding the legislative and executive or
the market players and general public. Yet, without prejudice to further research on this
point, we think that it is not. The position of the judiciary is simply different. Whereas the
legislative and executive powers, as well as market players and the general public, can
be considered as stakeholders or principals in the regulatory process, with the regula-
tory agency being their agent, the judiciary does not act as a stakeholder or principal. At
least as a matter of constitutional theory, the judiciary is not pursuing its own objectives
and its own agenda in regulatory processes, but rather enforcing the law.
The judiciary would then better be considered as another agent, endowed with its own
independence and active besides the regulatory agency. The independence of the ju-
diciary can even be seen as a further safeguard for the independence of the regulatory
agency from other actors. The judiciary is entrusted with its own mission – ensuring
the compliance with the law – which can lead to conflict with the regulatory agency, in
which case judicial review provides for a rule of conflict resolution where the judiciary
has the last word.
In this sense, judicial review would constitute a means for the other actors – in particular
the market players and the general public – to sanction the regulatory authority, albeit
through the mediation of the judiciary. Furthermore, given that the regulatory authority
is independent from these other actors, it might explain that judicial review is conducted
according to a standard of marginal review, which would reflect the independence of the
regulatory authority towards those principals whose interests are protected by judicial
review.
Fourthly, as regards peers, i.e. the other regulatory agencies, we remark the presence
of accountability mechanisms, primarily via the work of regulatory networks such as
BEREC or ACER, without any measure of independence. Here we can consider that
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since all regulatory agencies neither instruct nor sanction one another, they do not need
to be independent from one another. In addition, to put it metaphorically, they sit on the
same side of the fence.
Finally, as regards the European Commission, we note a number of accountability
measures, including the ability for the Commission to intervene against the regulatory
agency, be it via sector-specific means (for instance, the procedures of Articles 7 and
7a of Directive 2002/21) or via infringement proceedings under the TFEU. At the same
time, there are no measures to ensure the independence of Member State regulatory
agencies towards the European Commission. This raises some interesting issues for
further research. Indeed the position of the European Commission cannot be assimi-
lated to that of the national courts. The Commission is a principal in its own right, with
its own policy agenda (or that which it derives from interplay with the other EU insti-
tutions), which it seeks to accomplish through national regulatory agencies. Similarly,
the Commission cannot easily be reduced to just one node in a regulatory network with
the national agencies, considering that it holds specific means of intervention that place
it above the agencies rather than amongst them. As is well known, the issue of inde-
pendence of regulatory agencies towards the Commission, under EU law, is left to the
outdated Meroni doctrine, which rests on the formalistic policy/implementation distinc-
tion.
In terms of perceived quality, we discussed the results of a peer review exercise con-
ducted late last year in which participants were asked to make pairwise comparisons
between regulators operating in their country, and regulators operating in their sector.
We checked the consistency of these comparisons, both overall and between the differ-
ent types of respondent (academics, regulators, and regulatees), and found that levels
of overall consistency were acceptable. We then went on to test for a number of biases
in responses (such as the tendency to ‘boost’ one’s own regulator, for regulators, and
the tendency to ‘bash’ one’s own regulator, for regulatees), and corrected for these. We
then used these pairwise comparisons to construct a third index, this time an index of
perceived quality.
In terms of the links between independence, accountability, and perceived qual-
ity, we showed that there is both (1) a statistically significant and positive link between
independence and perceived quality, and (2) a statistically significant and positive link
between accountability and perceived quality. What is more, independence and ac-
countability are themselves positively related. This suggests that robust independence
and accountability mechanisms can co-exist and contribute to the effectiveness of a
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regulator. Evaluating the joint impact of independence and accountability is difficult be-
cause of the limited number of regulators in our sample, and because of the important
confounding effect of the level of resources available to the regulator.
Our research provides empirical support for the basic approach chosen in the EU for the
design of regulatory agencies, namely a combination of independence from the national
executive and legislative powers, on the one hand, and accountability to those powers,
as well as to European institutions, peers, private actors and courts, on the other hand.
A sustainable and fruitful trade-off between independence and accountability is possi-
ble.
As far as the policy recommendations stemming from this research are concerned, we
make five broad recommendations. One of these recommendations applies to both
regulators and policy-makers; three apply principally to regulators; and the last applies
to regulatees.
• Our first broad recommendation is that regulators should ask to be granted greater
independence and offer more accountability. In making this recommendation,
we recognize that we are, in a certain sense, pushing at an open door: regula-
tors are unlikely to advocate for greater and more demanding restraints on their
actions. Yet we believe that this recommendation now has added force in the
light of our findings regarding the compatibility of independence and accountabil-
ity, and the link between independence and perceived quality. Our findings help
defuse certain arguments against granting greater independence. A common ar-
gument found in the political science literature has been that independence and
accountability are inimical. That is, there is a trade-off between independence
and accountability, such that greater independence comes at the cost of lower
accountability, and vice versa. Our research shows that this is not the case, and
that indeed independence and accountability go hand in hand. Armed with this
finding, regulators can now make the case for greater independence without con-
ceding that this necessarily damages accountability – or, what is perhaps more
useful, can now freely accept requests for greater accountability without worrying
that this will damage independence. Indeed, our research lends support to the
EU regulatory model whereby both independence and accountability are empha-
sized. Accordingly, public choice literature which fails to factor in accountability
(for example, the work of Willam Niskanen) can be dismissed. Similarly, our re-
search shows that legal literature that emphasizes hard mechanisms (sanctions,
annulment, etc.) as against softer accountability criteria such as transparency or
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disclosure, might be misguided.
This is an important overall judgement, which differs from more stylised facts con-
cerning the impact of independence on sector-specific indicators of quality work
such as interconnection rates or reductions in consumer prices. It should be par-
ticularly valuable for sectors such as rail where sector-specific metrics of quality
are harder to come by. Perhaps more importantly, this finding is easily communi-
cable to policy-makers, since it does not require them to understand the details of
any given sector, but requires them only to understand that these are judgements
of quality provided by informed experts in regulation in selected sectors.
• Our second broad recommendation is that regulators should pursue increases
in independence and accountability as part of balanced packages of changes to
their governance. From an analysis of the correlations reported in section 5, it
might seem that, since the link between quality and accountability is stronger than
the link between quality and independence, regulators should devote all their ef-
fort to becoming more accountable, rather than more independent, since more
accountability will deliver greater increases in perceived quality. This would be
the wrong conclusion to draw, and does not take account of the relationship be-
tween independence and accountability. The most natural interpretation of the
positive link between independence and accountability is that politicians grant in-
dependence if they are satisfied that mechanisms of accountability exist. This link
also makes sense from the regulator’s perspective. Regulators realize that the
principles of accountability and independence are complements that may on oc-
casion pull in opposite directions and therefore need to be balanced to maximize
the regulator’s effectiveness. Regulators certainly value their independence and
non-interference from political institutions, but independence is a double-edged
sword: too much can lead to isolation from political processes and udnermine
the regulator’s ability to influence political decisions, and/or prevent decisions that
might undermine the regulator’s mission. To overcome the potential downsides of
independence and to influence decision making processes, regulators will adopt
actions that can be characterised as voluntary accountability measures, includ-
ing outreach to politicians, improved media relations, and pro-active provision of
information to relevant stakeholders.
Accountability is thus correlated with quality because independence, accountabil-
ity and quality form a virtuous triangle, which is the basis of the European model
of regulatory agencies. Accountability may have an additional effect on quality,
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because the act of having to explain actions to diverse publics acts as a spur to
regulators, but relying on this effect alone may not be prudent. Pursuing indepen-
dence and accountability together allows regulators to offer balanced packages of
governance changes to policy-makers. Pursuing accountability alone may fore-
close future improvements in independence.
We make a minor recommendation which is related to this point of pursuing bal-
anced packages. Regulators should be extremely reluctant to trade increases in
the resources available to them for improvements in the governance structures
that bind them. In our research we have found it extremely important to control for
the different levels of resources available to the regulators. Improved governance
structures may therefore not compensate for a freeze in resources.
• Our third broad recommendation is that regulators, in arguing for greater indepen-
dence and accountability, should focus on ‘low-hanging fruit’. By this we mean
that regulators who wish to increase their levels of independence should start
from the items as mapped in sections 2 and 3, identify which pro-independence
(or pro-accountability) provisions they lack, and lobby for the ‘missing items’ in the
order in which they appear in our map. This strategy of focusing on low-hanging
fruit makes sense when we relate the order of items given in section 2 not just to
their contribution to independence, but also to the willingness of politicians to con-
cede such provisions when drafting the legislation governing the regulator. Thus,
focusing on ‘missing’ low-independence items (such as an explicit statement of
independence, or a ban on ministerial instructions) will not only fill in any gaps in
the regulator’s governance, but will also be easier for ministers or legislators to
concede.
• Our fourth recommendation is to regulators who have scored well on accountabil-
ity and independence. Every regulator in our study can improve on the measures
of independence and accountability mapped in sections 2 and 3; but for those reg-
ulators which score highly on these measures we recommend a concentration on
high-level aspects of accountability which we were not fully able to assess in our
index, namely participation in horizontal networks and relationships with the legal
system. We were unable to include membership in horizontal networks as an indi-
cator of accountability because all of the regulators in our sample were members
of relevant networks. The proper conclusion to draw from this is not that member-
ship in such networks is unimportant for accountability, but rather that explaining
and listening to other similarly-situated regulators is widely seen as an essential
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component of being a modern European regulator. What may matter more, thus,
is not the brute fact of participation in such networks, but the degree to which reg-
ulators participate in such networks (possibly overlapping networks), and learn
from them. A similar story can be told with respect to accountability to the judi-
cial system: what matters is not the brute fact that regulators are accountable in
courts of law, but rather how well they acquit themselves when they find their de-
cisions challenged in a court. These are important aspects of accountability which
we have not fully been able to capture in our measurements. If, however, high-
independence, high-accountability regulators do seek to cement their reputations
as such, improvements in these two aspects would be natural options to pursue.
• Our fifth and final recommendation is a recommendation that regulatees seek to
make common cause with regulators in pushing for greater accountability. Certain
provisions relating to accountability, such procedural rules and codes of conduct,
are of tremendous interest to regulated actors, both per se and for their contri-
bution to making decisions evidence-based and thus partly predictable. Greater
steps towards accountability thus benefit regulatees as well as regulators.
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A. Appendices
A.1. Measures of consistency and reliability for paired comparison data
Where d is the number of circular triads observed, and where n is the number of objects
between which a respondent has been asked to choose, then define the coefficient of
consistent ζ as follows
ζ = 1− 24d
n3 − n
for odd values of n, and
ζ = 1− 24d
n3 − 4n
for even values of n.
We must, however, account for two particular features of the data:
• Respondents were allowed to express indifference between two regulators. Most
calculations of circular triads rely on strict preference relationships only. We there-
fore correct for ties by following the method outlined in de Vries (1995).
• Respondents were asked to compare two different sets of data – regulators in their
sector, and regulators in their country. We must calculate the number of circular
triads separately for each set of data. Accordingly, the statistics we present here
are averages of the statistics for each set of data.
Table A.1 shows the consistency of each of the respondents. It provides the number
of circular triads, the maximum possible number of circular triads, and the value of ζ.
Fractional numbers of circular triads result from the adjustment for indifference relations
between regulators.
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Table A.1.: Respondent consistency
ID Sector Area Country Circular triads Max possible Zeta
2 Energy Regulatee BE 4.00 7.00 0.43
3 Competition Regulatee BE 3.50 7.00 0.50
4 Energy Academic BE 4.25 7.00 0.39
5 Rail Regulator GB 2.00 7.00 0.71
7 Rail Regulator GB 3.25 7.00 0.54
8 Rail Academic GB 3.25 7.00 0.54
9 Rail Regulatee FR 1.75 7.00 0.75
10 Telecoms Academic BE 2.50 7.00 0.64
11 Telecoms Regulatee BE 4.75 7.00 0.32
12 Energy Academic BE 0.25 7.00 0.96
13 Rail Regulator GB 3.50 7.00 0.50
14 Competition Regulatee BE 3.75 7.00 0.46
15 Competition Regulator GB 3.50 7.00 0.50
16 Competition Regulatee FR 3.50 7.00 0.50
17 Rail Regulator DE 2.00 5.00 0.60
18 Rail Regulator GB 3.75 7.00 0.46
19 Energy Regulatee BE 1.50 7.00 0.79
20 Competition Regulator GB 4.25 7.00 0.39
21 Telecoms Regulatee BE 3.25 7.00 0.54
22 Telecoms Regulatee BE 3.00 7.00 0.57
23 Rail Regulatee FR 3.25 7.00 0.54
24 Energy Regulatee BE 2.00 7.00 0.71
25 Energy Regulator NL 1.75 5.00 0.65
26 Rail Regulatee GB 0.50 7.00 0.93
27 Telecoms Regulatee BE 2.00 7.00 0.71
28 Rail Regulatee FR 4.00 7.00 0.43
30 Telecoms Regulator BE 4.25 7.00 0.39
31 Telecoms Regulator FR 3.25 7.00 0.54
32 Telecoms Regulatee BE 2.75 7.00 0.61
33 Telecoms Academic GB 1.75 7.00 0.75
34 Energy Academic NL 2.50 5.00 0.50
35 Rail Regulatee FR 2.75 7.00 0.61
36 Competition Regulator BE 4.50 7.00 0.36
37 Telecoms Academic NL 1.75 5.00 0.65
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A.2. Statistical model of de jure independence
Formally, suppose we have i regulators who respond to j = 1...J items, and each item
has a number of response categories Cj . Each regulator has an amount of the latent
trait θi; each item has a difficulty (αj) and a discrimination parameter (βj). The latent
response of each regulator to each item (x∗ij) is therefore
x∗ij = αj + βjθi + εij ; i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., J
which then becomes a manifest response as it is discretized by a number of thresholds
for each item, γjc, for j = 1...J and c = 0...Cj , with γj0 ≡ −∞, γjCj ≡ ∞, and γj1 ≡ 0
for the purposes of identification:
xij = c if x∗ij ∈ (γj(c−1), γjc], i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., J, c = 1, ..., Cj
Thus, the more statutory independence (θ) the regulator has, the larger x∗ij , and the
more likely it is to clear the thresholds γjc and answer in a higher response category.
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A.3. Coding of legislation











































Objectives of regulatory policies de-
fined, with priorities
y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
Submit annual plan and annual bud-
get
y y n n n y n n y y y y y y y y
Minister can disapprove annual plan,
budget
n n n y n n n n n n y y n n n n
Minister can issue general guide-
lines
n y y n n n y n n y y y n n n n
Provide information to minister, par-
liament voluntarily, at own discretion
y y n n y y y y y y y y y y y y
Provide information to minister, par-
liament upon request
y y n n y y y y y n y y y y y y
Present annual reports and financial
statements
y y n y y y n y y y y y y y y y
Appear before parliamentary com-
mittee, including obligation to an-
swer questions on activities
y y n n y y y y n n n n y y y y
Periodic performance evaluation y n n n n n n n n n y y y y y y
Minister can dismiss head, board, for
performance related reasons
n n y n n n n n n y y y n n n n
Strategies and policy goals ex-
plained to stakeholders
y y y n y y y y y y y y y y y y
Rules on procedures and participa-
tion in decisions and rule making
y y n y y y y y y y y y y y y y
Reasoned decisions published y y y n y y y y y y y y y y y y
Decision making transparent y y y y y y n y y y y y y y y y
Data underlying decisions published y y n n y y n y y y y y y y y y
Annual Reports publicly available y y n n y y n y y y y y y y y y
Code of conduct/guidelines n n n n n n n y y y n y y y y y
Press releases/newsletters y y y n y y n y y y y y y y y y
Advisory body with stake holder par-
ticipation
y y n n y n n n n n n n n n n n
Public consultations with feedback
opportunities
y y n n y y n y y y y y y y y y
Judicial appeals with full review y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
Reports to European Commission y y n y y y n y y y y y y y n y
Commission can intervene before
decisions are adopted/finalized
y y n y y y n y y y y y y y n y
Member of horizontal network y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
Note: Not all criteria listed here are considered in the body of the text.
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y y n y y y y y y y y y y y y y
Political incompatibility
provisions
y y n n* y y y y y y y y y y y y
Exclusive responsibili-
ties and tasks
y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
No ministerial approval
of decisions
y y n y y y y n n† n† n† n† n y y y
No indirect or direct
ministerial instruc-
tions/directions




y y n n y y y y y y y y y y y y
Separate annual budget
allocation
y y n n y y y y y y y y y y y y




n 5y 5y 5y
One term, renewal
barred
n n n n y y y n¶ 1x n.a n 1 x 4 y n n n n
Removal only for sick-
ness, incapacity
n n n y y n n y n n n n n n n n
Note: Not all criteria listed here are considered in the body of the text. For multisectoral regulators, coding
of legislative provisions was based on provision
* Incompatibility for local, regional political office.
† General instructions possible.
‡With exception of negative decisions in merger cases.
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